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A DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S DECISION
WHETHER TO SEEK THE DEATH PENALTY:
TOWARD AN IMPROVED PROCESS
Jonathan DeMay*

[H]owever strongly one may favor the death penalty in principle,
its propriety in practice depends on our ability to restrict its use to
the worst of our criminals and to impose it in a nondiscriminatory
fashion.'
Introduction

A district attorney's decision whether to seek the death penalty
is the most critical decision in the criminal justice system,2 because,
if imposed, the death penalty results in the state sanctioned execution of an individual, an "irremediable" decision. Despite the
grave implications of this decision, the United States Supreme
Court has never required that any procedures or guidelines be
promulgated to control the process employed by prosecutors to
reach this decision.4 Instead, district attorneys look to a startlingly
broad range of policies when deciding whether to seek the death
penalty.
In New York State, for example, Bronx County District Attorney Robert Johnson (the "Bronx DA") steadfastly opposes the
utilization of the death penalty. After the enactment of the death
* J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 1998. B.B.A., Accounting, Siena
College, 1995. The author would like to thank Professor Bruce Green, Fordham University School of Law, for his guidance and suggestions.
1. SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 5 (1989) (quoting Walter Berns, Defending the
Death Penalty, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 503, 511 (1980)).
2. See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT
CONTROVERSIES 313 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997) ("[Tlhe decision whether to seek
the death sentence is perhaps the most far-reaching decision to be made in the whole
arena of criminal justice.").
3. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) ("In capital proceedings generally, this Court has demanded that factfinding procedures aspire to a heightened
standard of reliability . . . . This special concern is a natural consequence of the
knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties;
that death is different.").
4. See BEDAU, supra note 2 (noting that unlike a jury's decision whether to impose the death penalty, prosecutors do not have statutory guidelines, or even any
comparable guidelines, imposed on their decision whether to seek the death penalty).
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penalty in New York,5 the Bronx DA publicly announced that it
was not his "present intention" to utilize the death penalty despite
its widespread public and political support. 6 Moreover, he later refused to state that there were any circumstances under which he

would seek the death penalty, even when this refusal meant certain
supersedure 7 by New York Governor George Pataki (the "Governor").' When he was superseded,9 the Bronx DA challenged the
5. New York Penal Law section 60.06 provides that a person convicted of murder
in the first degree must be sentenced "to death, to life imprisonment without parole
or to a term of imprisonment for a class A-I felony other than a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole." N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.06, 125.27(1) (McKinney
1996). If a prosecutor elects to seek a sentence of death, the prosecutor must, within
120 days of a defendant's arraignment upon an indictment charging murder in the first
degree, provide a written notice of intention to seek the death penalty to the defendant and the court. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 250.40, 400.27, 470.30 (McKinney 1996).
If the prosecution elects not to seek the death penalty, the decision is irrevocable.

N.Y.

CRIM. PROC. LAW

§ 250.40.

6. Matter of Johnson v. Pataki, No. 1714/96, slip op. at 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., July 9,
1996). The Bronx DA based this upon his "intense respect for the value and sanctity
of human life," his fear of convicting an innocent person, and his skepticism regarding
the death penalty's deterrent effect and the fairness of its application. Id. at 4-5. In
addition, the Bronx DA did not feel the commitment of time and resources required
by a death penalty prosecution were worthwhile given the uncertainty that a jury
would impose it or that its imposition would be upheld on appeal. See id. at 5. Finally,
the Bronx DA also proffered a list of areas where the money that would be committed
towards death penalty prosecutions would be better spent. See id.
7. In New York, a Governor's power to supersede a district attorney is statutorily
granted. See N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 63(2) (McKinney 1996) ("Whenever required by the
governor, attend in person, or by one of his deputies,... for the purpose of managing
and conducting ... criminal actions or proceedings as shall be specified in such requirement; in which case the attorney-general or his deputy so attending shall exercise
all the powers and perform all the duties ... which the district attorney would otherwise be authorized or required to exercise or perform; and ... the district attorney
shall only exercise such powers and perform such duties as are required of him by the
attorney-general or deputy attorney-general so attending."). This power is employed
to ensure that the laws are executed faithfully. See Robert M. Pitler, Superseding The
DistrictAttorneys in New York City-The Constitutionalityand Legality of Executive
Order No. 55, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 517 (1973) (stating that there is no question
regarding the constitutionality of the governor's supersedure power in New York.).
8. James Dao, The Governor: DistrictAttorney Wouldn't Move, Pataki Aides Say,
So He Was Moved, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at B2 ("Aides to Governor George E.
Pataki ... suggested that Mr. Johnson do one of two things: express willingness to
seek the death penalty in certain cases, or declare his opposition to capital punishment and then voluntarily step aside so that Mr. Pataki could name a special prosecutor ... Mr. Johnson rebuffed both ideas.").
9. By issuing Executive Order 27, the Governor required New York State Attorney General Dennis C. Vacco to supersede the Bronx DA. See Johnson, No. 1714/96,
slip op. at 11. The Governor found that the Bronx DA had "instituted a blanket
policy not to seek the death penalty" that violated the Bronx DA's obligation to
"make informed, reasoned decisions on a case-by-case basis .... " Id. at 12. The
Governor issued the Order based upon his obligation to ensure that the laws are
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Governor's power to do so until his ability to appeal had been
exhausted.' 0
In Pennsylvania, the policy instituted by Philadelphia County
District Attorney Lynne Abraham (the "Philadelphia DA") regarding the utilization of the death penalty is nearly as zealous as
the Bronx DA's opposition to its utilization." Her office seeks the
death penalty nearly every time the law allows it.' 2 The Philadelphia DA employs this policy despite the high financial costs of the
death penalty,' 3 and often without regard for the criminal history
or the state of mind of the defendant at the time the crime oc"faithfully executed." Id. The Governor's belief that the "brutal murder of Police
Officer Kevin Gillespie" warranted that the death penalty should be sought. Id. at 13.
In addition, the Governor was concerned that the Bronx DA's policy "threaten[ed]
the validity of death sentences imposed in cases in other counties" because it could
'lead to challenges of New York's death penalty statute upon grounds that the "sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases
.... Id. at 12.
10. On July 9, 1996, the Bronx DA filed a writ of mandamus to prevent Governor
Pataki from enforcing Executive Order 27. See id. at 1-2. The Governor argued that
Executive Order 27 impermissibly supplanted the Governor's policy regarding the
death penalty in place of the statutory scheme enacted by the Legislature. See id. at
18. In addition, he argued that the supersedure interfered with a district attorney's
independent Executive power. See id. at 22.
In Matter of Johnson v. Pataki, 91 N.Y.2d 214, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 668 N.Y.S.2d 978
(1997) the New York Court of Appeals declined to decide whether the decision to
supersede a district attorney was justiciable, let alone what the standard of review
would be if it was justiciable. 91 N.Y.2d at 226, 691 N.E.2d at 1007, 668 N.Y.S.2d at
983. The New York Court of Appeals did hold, however, that Executive Order 27
expressed the "executive judgment" of the Governor "that a 'blanket policy'-never
unequivocally disavowed-existed that precluded the exercise of discretion by the
District Attorney," id. at 228, 691 N.E.2d at 1008, 668 N.Y.S.2d at 984, and thus there
was a threat to the faithful execution of the death penalty law that supported this
particular supersedure." Id. at 226, 691 N.E.2d at 1007, 668 N.Y.S.2d at 984. The New
York Court of Appeals further stated that the Legislature clearly "did not allow one
or all 62 District Attorneys to functionally veto the statute by adopting a 'blanket
policy,' thereby in effect refusing to exercise discretion." Id. at 226-27, 691 N.E.2d at
1007, 668 N.Y.S.2d at 983. The New York Court of Appeals noted that the supersedure did not "substitute the Governor's policy choice" for that of the Bronx DA. Id.
at 226-27, 691 N.E.2d at 1007, 668 N.Y.S.2d at 983. Rather, "the Governor designated
the Attorney General in place of the District Attorney in prosecuting the entire matter, including the exercise of discretion regarding sentence." Id.
11. See Tina Rosenberg, The Deadliest D.A., in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 320 (quoting the Philadelphia DA) ("When it
comes to the death penalty, I am passionate. I truly believe that it is manifestly
correct.").
12. See id. at 324. Typically, the Philadelphia County District Attorney's Office
seeks the death penalty in any case in which the prosecutors believe that they can
prove a single aggravating factor. See id.
13. The death penalty is estimated to cost three million dollars per case-three
times greater than the estimated cost of a life sentence in Pennsylvania. See id. at 321.
The high expense of its use, however, is "not even a consideration." Id. at 320.
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curred. 4 In fact, she focuses almost entirely on the victims and
their families, with little accompanying concern for the
defendant.15
The ideological dichotomy between the policies of the Bronx and
Philadelphia DAs is a dramatic illustration of the potential for arbitrariness that is inherent in the decision whether to seek the death
penalty. Indeed, the most important variable affecting whether a
defendant will be subject to the death penalty is often the particular ideology of the district attorney of a respective county.1 6 There
are, however, more subtle forms of arbitrariness, such as bias based
upon race, gender and class, that pervade the process.' 7 In addition, inappropriate political considerations, or even8 public pressure, can have a significant impact on the decision.1
14. Id. at 320-21.
15. Lynne Abraham has stated, "I've looked at all those sentenced to be executed.
No one will shed a tear. Prison is too good for them. They don't deserve to live. I
represent the victim and the family. I don't care about killers." Id. at 321.
16. See Stewart F. Hankcock, Jr. et al., Race, Unbridled Discretion, and the State
Constitutional Validity of New York's Death Penalty Statute-Two Questions, 59 ALB.
L. REV. 1545, 1563-64 ("A result of the unguided discretion afforded to prosecutors,
each of whom has sole prosecutorial authority in a particular county, is that whether
the death penalty is sought against a defendant for a given crime may depend on the
happenstance of where (i.e., the county in which) the crime is committed."); Rosenberg, supranote 11, at 319, 321("Prosecutorial discretion insures that the lives of identical murderers committing identical crimes can be valued completely differently on
the opposite sides of a county line."). -Cf. William T. Pizzi, Understanding
ProsecutorialDiscretionin the United States: The Limits of Comparative Procedureas
an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1344 (1993),(ngting that "the same
criminal laws may be enforced differently within a single state").
17. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Death Penalty Sentencilig: Research
Indicates Pattern of Racial Disparities,in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES

271 (1997) (concluding that the race of the victim has a strong

influence on death sentences); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death
Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, in THE DEATH PENALTY
IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 275 [hereinafter Bright, Counsel for the
Poor] (arguing that the lack of financial resources is among the "most significant"

variables impacting upon the outcome of death penalty cases);
STATISTICS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

that one out of eight individuals arrested for murder is female);
STATISTICS,
TICE 46 (2d

BUREAU OF JUSTICE

1988, at 9 (1989) (finding
BUREAU OF JUSTICE

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT To THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSed. 1988) (finding that one out of every hundred death row inmates is

female).
18. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1521, 1558 (1981) (arguing that prosecutorial decision-making is susceptible to
political influence); Stephen B. Bright et. al, The Death Penalty in the Twenty-First
Century, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 239, 286 (1995) [hereinafter Bright et al., Death Penalty
(stating that death penalty cases allow prosecutors to get a large amount of public
exposure); Daniel Wise, Prosecutors Want Death Penalty: Qualms Voiced About
Costs, Time, Training of Lawyers, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 3, 1995, at 1 (quoting Albany
County District Attorney Sol Greenberg that "[flailure to seek [the death penalty]
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These considerations, while troubling in any context, are deeply
disturbing in the context of the decision whether a defendant will
be eligible for the death penalty. Despite the importance of ensuring that the death penalty is sought only against those who truly
deserve it, 19 given the wide range of district attorney policies regarding the imposition of the death penalty and the potential influence of bias, inappropriate political considerations and subjective
judgments, the death penalty could be sought against an individual
for whom that punishment would be inappropriate. Conversely, a
defendant who should be eligible for the imposition of the death
penalty could be inappropriately removed from consideration. z
This Note argues that the dangers inherent in the present situation justify the imposition of controls over the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in the decision whether to seek the death
penalty and explores the potential implementation of additional
controls in light of the deference traditionally given prosecutorial
discretion, the practical difficulties inherent in attempting to implement such controls and the strong need for prosecutorial discretion
within the criminal justice system. Part I presents the nature and
scope of prosecutorial discretion judicial review of that discretion
and the influence that individual prosecutors can have in the exercise of such discretion in the context of the death penalty. Part II
examines previously proffered controls of prosecutorial discretion
and considers the appropriateness of utilizing these controls to
limit the exercise of discretion in the decision whether to seek the
death penalty. Part III asserts that within our current criminal justice system, potential controls must focus on improving the decision-making process in which discretion is exercised. This Note
concludes that a single statewide inter-office death penalty committee is the most appropriate control of the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in such a critical decision.
I. Prosecutorial Discretion
Prosecutors are the "gatekeepers" of the criminal justice system,21 as they decide whether to charge suspects, and, if so, for
will give political opponents an opening to air charges from the victim's family that a
prosecutor has been 'soft on crime'" resulting in a tactic that "'could be very devastating for incumbent DAs."').
19. BEDAU, supra note 2, at 313; Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 411.
20. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 167-72, 230-31 (1969) (discussing whether failing to punish the guilty is unjust).
21. Phil Manzano, The Hard Line on Crime, OREGONIAN (Portland), Apr. 15,
1995, at Al.
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what crime.22 The power to decide who to prosecute is a matter of
great discretion, and largely an unreviewed one.2 3 Within this system, the policies of district attorneys toward the death penalty have
a great impact upon its utilization from county to county.24 Other
forms of arbitrariness also can impact the decision, including
race,25 class,26 gender27 and political and subjective judgments.28
A. The Nature and Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion
Prosecutorial discretion encompasses the power to charge or to
refrain from charging an individual with a crime; to reduce charges
to a lesser offense prior to trial; to not charge prior offenses; to
dismiss or request court dismissal after a trial commences; or to
recommend a lesser sentence.29 This is not a single decision, but
rather, a process involving a group of interrelated judgments made
in no predetermined order.3° In making this decision,31 prosecu22. See infra Part I.A.
23. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("[Slo long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in [the prosecutor's] discretion."); United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (explaining that a prosecutor's charging
decision is granted a great deal of latitude); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 60708 (1985) (explaining that a prosecutor's charging decision is generally granted great
discretion); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, cert. den. sub nom., Cox v. Hauberg,
381 U.S. 935 (1965) (explaining that under the separation of powers doctrine courts
are not to interfere with a federal prosecutor's "control over criminal prosecutions");
Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting the "very broad
discretion" granted to prosecutors); Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard For the
Prosecutor'sExercise of the ChargingDiscretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513 (1993)
[hereinafter Gershman, A Moral Standard] ("The prosecutor's decision to institute
criminal charges is the broadest and least regulated power in American criminal
law."). For early evidence of judicial recognition of the broad leeway given
prosecutorial discretion, see Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 457 (1868) (Public prosecutions are within the "exclusive jurisdiction of the district attorney.").
24. See supra note 16.
25. See discussion infra Part I.D.1.
26. See discussion infra Part I.D.2.
27. See discussion infra Part I.D.3.
28. See discussion infra Part I.D.4.
29. See Stanton L. Stein, Comment, ProsecutorialDiscretion and the Initiation of
Criminal Complaints, in THE INVISIBLE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DISCRETION & THE LAW
137 (Burton Atkins & Mark Pogrebin eds., 1978) (arguing that these functions are the
most important aspects of discretion). See also Sidney I. Lezak & Maureen Leonard,
The Prosecutor'sDiscretion: Out of the Closet, Not Out of Control, in DISCRETION,
JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY: A PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE 44 (Carl F. Pinkele &
William C. Louthan eds., 1985) (stating that prosecutorial discretion is, essentially, the
power of a prosecutor to selectively enforce the laws).
30. See FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT
WITH A CRIME 11 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1970) ("The decision to charge, unlike the
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tors must balance the opposing demands on the victim and the accused, the accusations of the police and societal expectations
regarding the punishment of the defendant.32
Prosecutors attempt to balance these concerns while working
within the confines of a criminal justice system replete with ambiguous statutes 33 and subject to continual variation due to ever-shifting political and social priorities.34 Moreover prosecutors must
consider the "infinite variety of detailed facts which human conduct continually presents. '35 Thus, the criminal justice system not
only allows for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 36 but also
requires the flexibility it provides.37
decision to arrest, is not a unitary decision made at a readily identifiable time by a
specified individual. It is, instead, a process consisting of a series of interrelated decisions, and the steps in the process do not always occur in the same sequence.").
31. Within our current system, each district attorney is free to set policies for that
office based upon available prosecutorial resources and "local crime concerns and
priorities." Pizzi, supra note 16, at 1344.
32. See T. KENNETH MORAN & JOHN L. COOPER, DISCRETION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 52 (1983). Other factors that prosecutors consider include the
attitude of the victim, cooperation by the defendant, resource costs of prosecution,
and effectiveness of alternative procedures. See MILLER, supra note 30, at 173-85, 21332, 241-52, 260-80. In addition, when deciding whether to plea bargain, prosecutors
weigh factors such as the seriousness of the offense, background of the defendant,
strength of the case, willingness of the victim to testify, attractiveness of the case to
the jury, dangerousness of the defendant, and value of information the defendant
might provide in future cases. See Pizzi, supra note 16, at 1369.
33. Criminal conduct necessarily must be described in generalized terms because
they must "sweep together identical acts" by "markedly different actors amid infinitely variable circumstances." Charles D. Breitel, Controls in CriminalLaw Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 431 (1960) (citing ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN AMERICA 37-38 (1930)).
34. See id. at 9 (citing RosCoE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 36).

35. Id. (citing

POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 36).

36. In the context of this Note, discretion is best understood as a "residual concept-the room left for subjective judgments by the statutes, judicial decisions, social
patterns and institutional pressures that bear on an official's decision." Vorenberg,
supra note 18, at 1521, 1524.
37. See Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial

Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REv. 1, 2, 5 (1971) (Prosecutorial discretion provides for
flexibility and sensitivity in the decision-making process.); Breitel, supra note 33, at
427 (1960) ("If every policeman, every prosecutor, every court, and every presentence
agency performed his or its responsibility in strict accordance with the rule of law,
precisely and narrowly laid down, the criminal law would be ordered but intolerable."); MILLER, supra note 30, at 151 ("Full enforcement of the criminal law in the
sense that every violator of every statute should be apprehended, charged, convicted,
and sentenced to the maximum extent permitted by law has probably never been
seriously considered a tenable idea.").
A criminal justice system without prosecutorial discretion would sacrifice the subtleties that are an indispensable feature of decision-making of any satisfactory quality.
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 899 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), affd, 481 U.S.
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B.

Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion

A prosecutor's use of discretion to determine whether to prosecute an individual, and if so, for what crime or degree of crime
generally is not reviewable,38 but it is subject to constitutional limitations, 39 primarily, selective prosecution4" and vindictive prosecution.41 Selective prosecution occurs when the decision whether to
prosecute is "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard
such as race, religion, or arbitrary classification."4 2 Selective prosecution may be demonstrated when "the administration of a criminal law is 'directed so exclusively against a particular class of
persons.., with a mind so unequal and oppressive' that the system
of prosecution amounts to 'a practical denial' of equal protection
of the law."4 3 Vindictive prosecution may result when a prosecutor
uses the charging process to penalize the exercise of constitutional
or statutory rights, thus resulting in a due process violation.4 4 A
rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness is recognized whenever a
prosecutor increases "the number or severity of charges after a de'4 5
fendant has asserted legally protected rights.
279 (1987) (The court explained that a statistical study relied upon by the defendant
"not only ignore[d] quantitative differences in cases: looks, age, personality, education, profession, job, clothes, demeanor, and remorse, just to name a few, but it [also
was] incapable of measuring qualitative differences of such things as aggravating and
mitigating factors. There are, in fact, no exact duplicates in capital crimes and capital
defendants."); Pizzi, supra note 16, at 1369 (noting additional factors including vocational skills, family ties and responsibilities, community ties and socioeconomic status). It is worthy to note that it is questionable whether a "rigid and mechanistic"
system of prosecution actually would lead to greater consistency. Abrams, supra note
37, at 10. If discretion is eliminated and thus distinguishable cases are treated alike,
this results in inconsistency as well. See id. at 5 n.10. Abrams states that an advocate
of such a system likely would respond that the "cases are not distinguishable since the
differences would be deemed irrelevant at that stage of the process." Id. at 5 n.10.
This response, however, would be lacking because the very decision that such differences are irrelevant is rife with discretion-the very thing that a rigid and mechanistic
system seeks to eliminate.
38. See supra note 23.
39. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S.
114, 125 (1979)) ("[A] prosecutor's discretion is 'subject to constitutional
constraints.'").
40. See id. (explaining that selective prosecution violates Due Process).
41. See Moran v. Burbine 475 U.S. 412, 466 (1985) (dissenting opinion) (explaining that vindictive prosecution violates due process) (citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21(1974)).
42. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
43. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464-65 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373
(1886)).
44. See Katherine Lowe, ProsecutorialDiscretion, 81 GEO. L.J. 1029, 1035 (1993).
45. Id. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 940 F.2d 1000, 1002 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1050 (1992) (quoting Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 802 (1989)) ("The
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Even when equal protection or due process rights are at issue,
however, courts are reluctant to intrude upon the "'special province"' of the prosecutor. 46 For example, when unconstitutional selective prosecution is alleged, a court will continue to presume the

prosecutor47acted correctly unless there is "clear evidence to the
contrary.
Several factors form the basis of the great judicial deference

given to the prosecutor's decision-making process. First, the decision whether to prosecute is especially ill-adapted to judicial review
because the decision involves factors that are not easily open to the
type of analysis that is within judicial competence, such as the
strength of the evidence in the case, the general deterrent value of

the prosecution, and the relation to the enforcement priorities and
the "overall enforcement plan" of the government.4 8 Second,

courts are reluctant to encroach upon the operation of this essential executive constitutional role by interfering with the exercise of
discretion by prosecutors in their administration of criminal prosecutions. 49 Third, judicial examination of prosecutorial decisionmaking leads to problematic "systemic costs," including the delay
of criminal proceedings, and the chilling of law enforcement by ex-

posing a prosecutor's decision-making process, as well as the enforcement policy of the prosecutor's office, to external scrutiny. 50

prosecution is unlikely to gain any new insight as to the moral character of the defendant, the nature and extent of the crime, or the defendant's suitability for rehabilitation at the conclusion of trial that it did not already possess from its extended
investigation. Rather, the prosecution in such circumstances 'can be expected to operate in the context of roughly the same sentencing considerations . . . ; any unexplained change in the sentence is therefore subject to a presumption of
vindictiveness."').
46. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832
(1985)) (A selective prosecution claim requests a court "to exercise judicial power
over a 'special province' of the Executive."); United States v. Bassford, 812 F.2d 16,
19 (1st Cir.) ("[C]ourts should presume that the prosecution was pursued in good
faith execution of the law."), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1022 (1987).
47. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation,
272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)).
48. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607. "Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than
the exercise" of discretion by the prosecutor in deciding whether to prosecute and
what type of charge under which to prosecute. Newman, 382 F.2d at 480.
49. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (Judicial deference to prosecutors "stems from
a concern not to unnecessarily impair the performance of a core executive constitutional function."); Newman, 382 F.2d 481 (As an "agent and attorney for the Executive" the prosecutor is responsible to the Executive and the courts have no power
over either the prosecutor's exercise of discretion or the prosecutor's "motives" regarding the performance of duties within the scope of employment.).
50. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 ("Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails
systemic costs of particular concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the
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1. Judicial Review of ProsecutorialDiscretion in the Context of
the Death Penalty
In Furman v. Georgia,51 the Supreme Court addressed whether
the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment. 52 In his concurrence, Justice Douglas placed particular emphasis on the "practically untrammeled discretion" judges and juries possess in
deciding whether to impose the death penalty. 3 The extent of this
discretion allowed for the selective application of the death penalty. 54 As a result, the Supreme Court held that, as imposed at that
time,55 the death penalty violated the requirement of equal protection "implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual punishment.' "56
In Gregg v. Georgia,57 the Supreme Court specifically addressed
the role of prosecutorial discretion in the decision whether to seek
the death penalty.58 The petitioner asserted that a prosecutor's
"unfettered authority '59 to select whom to prosecute for a capital
offense was arbitrary and capricious, and therefore, unconstitutional under Furman.6" The Supreme Court, however, rejected the
argument that the mere existence of "discretionary stages '61 violated Furman.62 The Court explained that Furman held that the
decision to impose the death penalty must be "guided by standards
criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's
motives and decision-making to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial
effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement policy.").
51. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
52. 408 U.S. at 240.
53. Id. at 248.
54. Id. at 255.
55. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan stated that the imposition of the death
penalty was so arbitrary that "it smack[ed] of little more than a lottery system."
Furman, 408 U.S. at 293. Justice Brennan described the procedure surrounding a
jury's decision whether to impose the death sentence as "wholly unguided by standards .... " Thus, the procedures did not "guard against the totally capricious selection of criminals for the punishment of death." Id. at 294-95.
56. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
57. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
58. 428 U.S. at 153.
59. Id. at 199.
60. Id.
61. The petitioner argued that discretion permeated the entire system of capital
sentencing and thus the system was in violation of Furman. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at
199. The petitioner noted the discretion a prosecutor had to decide whether to prosecute or to plea bargain with a capital-eligible defendant. See id. In addition, juries had
the discretion to choose to convict a defendant of a lesser included offense even if
evidence supports a capital verdict. See id. Finally, both the Governor of the State of
Georgia and the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles could commute the death
sentence of a defendant. See id.
62. See id. at 199.
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so that the sentencing authority would focus on the particularized
circumstances of the crime and the defendant . .63
".. The Court
determined that this was necessary to "minimize the risk that the
death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected group
of individuals ...
."I' Moreover, the Supreme Court reasoned that
Furman did not suggest that the decision to "afford an individual
defendant mercy violates the Constitution."65 The Court further
noted that if the discretion to remove defendants from consideration as candidates for the death penalty was found unconstitutional, as the petitioner suggested, prosecuting authorities would
be required to charge a capital offense whenever there arguably
had been a capital murder.66 The Supreme Court then rejected this
result, stating that it would lead to a "system ...totally alien to our
67
notions of criminal justice.

C. The Influence of Individual District Attorneys on the Death
Penalty Decision
District attorneys are generally elected on a county-wide basis.68
This election structure allows for a wide disparity in the utilization
of the death penalty from county to county, as district attorneys
each determine the criminal justice policies of their respective
counties. 69 Contrasting the policies of, arguably, the death penalty's staunchest opponent and its most zealous advocate among
district attorneys, provide a dramatic illustration of the influence
that a particular district attorney's policy has on the utilization of
the death penalty as a form of punishment.
1.

The Death Penalty Antagonist

On March 7, 1995, the New York State Legislature enacted a
comprehensive set of statutes that provided the death penalty as a
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 199 n.50.
Id. at 199 n.50.

68. See Pizzi, supra note 16, at 1325, 1343 (1993) (stating district attorneys typically are elected on a county or district basis).
69. See Hankcock, Jr. et al, supra note 16; Pizzi, supra note 16, at 1344 ("In a state
jurisdiction in which prosecutors usually run for office on a county-wide basis, are
funded on the same local basis, and must work with juries drawn from the local population, it is almost guaranteed that prosecutors elected in highly rural counties will
have quite different constituencies and will face very different criminal problems from
those elected in heavily urban areas.").
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form of punishment for first degree murder.7" Immediately following the passage of these death penalty statutes, the Bronx DA issued a press release stating that it was his "present intention not to
utilize the death penalty provisions of the statute .... 71 72
Instead,
parole.
without
life
pursue
"aggressively
would
office
his
On March 14, 1996, a gunfight between the police and several
fleeing suspects resulted in the murder of New York City Police
Officer Kevin Gillespie.73 After his arrest, the primary suspect acknowledged that he knew he was being pursued by police officers.7 1 Thus, the Bronx DA was presented with a case eligible for
the death penalty.75
On March 19, 1996, the swiftness with which the Bronx DA pre76
viously decided against seeking the death penalty in another case
70. See supra note 5.
71. Pataki,No. 1714/96, slip op. at 3. See supra note 5.
72. Id.
73. See Clifford Krauss, Officer Killed and Another Hurt in Carjacking Battle in the
Bronx, Mar. 15, 1996, N.Y. TIMES, at Al, B2. The gunfight, which also resulted in
another police officer being shot, occurred when the officers attempted to prevent a
carjacking near the Grand Concourse in Bronx County. See id. at Al. Two unmarked
police cars made a "bumper-to-bumper sandwich" of the suspects' car, forcing the
individuals within the car to flee. See Clifford Krauss, 3 Men Held in Killing of Officer,
Bringing Calls for Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, at 1, 24. The suspects tried to shoot
their way out, and after the shoot-out, which totaled 40 shots, Officer Gillespie was
killed. See id. In addition, off-duty transit officer Terrance McAllister was injured,
along with three bystanders-two 14-year-old boys playing basketball, and an unidentified woman. See id. at 24. Angel Diaz, the primary suspect, had an extensive criminal history, having amassed three felony convictions-two of which were violent
crimes-before the shooting of Officer Gillespie. See id.
74. After the arrest, Diaz made statements to investigators acknowledging that he
was aware that they were being pursued by police officers before they began shooting.
See id.
75. A person is guilty of first-degree murder, and thus is potentially subject to the
death penalty, when:
[w]ith the intent to cause the death of another person, [the defendant] causes
the death of such person or of a third person... and [the defendant commits
the crime in any of the twelve ways specified by the legislature, including
when] the intended victim was a police officer ... who at the time of the
killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was
a police officer ....
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1996).
76. On December 19, 1995, Michael Vernon was arrested for suspicion of killing
five people in a shoe store in the Bronx. See Matthew Purdy, 5 Are Killed by Gunman
in Bronx Shoe Store, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1995, at Al. Within a day of the shooting,
a spokesman for the Bronx DA stated that even if the case fit the criteria for the
death penalty, the death penalty would not be sought in the case. Id. Governor
Pataki accepted the Bronx DA's decision, albeit with "grave reservations." Pataki,
No. 1714/96, slip op. at 7. The Governor's reservations were based upon the Bronx
DA's evasive answer regarding whether he had a policy not seek the death penalty in
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led the Governor to inquire if there were any circumstances under
which the Bronx DA would seek the death penalty. 77 The Governor's aides suggested that the Bronx DA either "express willingness to seek the death penalty in certain cases, or declare his
opposition to capital punishment and then voluntarily step aside so
that Governor Pataki could name a special prosecutor. ' 78 Despite
inevitable supersedure, the Bronx DA rebuffed the suggestion, and
denounced the Governor for his "heavy handed approach. ' 79 One
day after this response, the Governor issued Executive Order 2780
to supersede the Bronx DA in the prosecution of the case. 1
Thereafter, the Bronx DA challenged the Governor's ability to supersede him until he had exhausted his appeals.82
2.

The death penalty protagonist

On April 23, 1991, two shooting victims were discovered in a
home in southwest Philadelphia.83 Both had been shot in the
head.84 One was found dead at the scene, and the other survived.85
The Philadelphia County DA's Office sought the death penalty
against the defendant,8 6 the surviving victim's boyfriend. 87 A jury

later imposed the death sentence. 88 The defendant, however,
would not have been a candidate for the death penalty in many
prosecutors' offices89 because he lacked a violent criminal history, 90
any circumstance, coupled with the Bronx DA's rapid decision not to seek the death
penalty despite the 120 day period designed to allow for "due deliberation." Id.
77. See Pataki, No. 1714/96, slip- op. at 9. Governor Pataki stated that "No one,
including a District Attorney, can substitute his or her sense of right and wrong for
that of the Legislature." Id.
78. Dao, supra note 8, at B2.
79. In response, the Bronx DA stated that he had never "taken 'a position in opposition to the death penalty,'" but rather he had "left the door ajar, however slight"
that he would seek the death penalty. Pataki, No. 1714/96, slip op. at 9-10. He also
stated that by enacting the death penalty, the Legislature had given him a "tool, not
an order to use it," and that the Governor was attempting to "impose his will" with a
"heavy handed approach." Id. at 10.
80. See supra note 9.

81. See id. at 11. The Bronx DA was replaced by New York State Attorney General Dennis Vacco. See id.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See
See
See
See

supra note 10.
id. at 319.
id.
id.

86. See id. at 326. The defendant rejected a proposed plea to a life sentence plus
ten to twenty years for aggravated assault. See id.
87. See id. at 330.
88. See id. at 332.

89. See id. at 320 (discussing how most other cities' district attorneys' offices likely
would have sought life imprisonment).
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he potentially had suffered childhood abuse91 and questions existed
regarding his mental health.92
This case was not unusual for the Philadelphia County District
Attorney's Office because the Philadelphia DA seeks the death
penalty nearly every time the law allows it,93 despite its financial
costs94 and her own belief that it is not an effective deterrent.95
The Philadelphia DA bases her aggressive utilization of the death
penalty upon her constituents' support of its use and her belief that
it both returns a "feeling of control" to the community and is
"manifestly correct." 96
D. Other Forms of Influence on the Death Penalty Decision
1. The Influence of Race on the Decision Whether to Seek the
Death Penalty
9
In McCleskey v. Kemp, 7 the Supreme Court directly addressed
the influence of race on the decision whether to seek the death
penalty.98 In McCleskey, a defendant relied solely on a statistical
study entitled the "Baldus study" 99 to prove that Georgia adminis90. See id. at 330.
91. See id. at 330 (Barnaby Wittels, the defendant's lawyer, stated that "[the defendant] was an abused child, bounced around from relative to relative.").
92. The defendant drank peroxide and took approximately twenty pills before attempting to cut his wrists, only to discontinue the attempt after making a superficial
wound. See id. at 320. The defendant's confession included a description of a typical
day with the surviving victim that was later described as "pure fantasy." Id. at 321. In
addition, the defendant had attempted to commit suicide on more than one prior
occasion. Id. at 326.
93. See Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 320 (noting that "no prosecutor in the country uses the death penalty more" than the Philadelphia DA). In Pennsylvania, murder
in the first degree occurs when an "intentional killing" is committed. 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2502 (West 1974). If a defendant is convicted of first degree murder,
section 9711(d) provides eighteen aggravating circumstances for the jury to consider
when deciding whether to impose the death penalty, including whether it was a contract murder, a felony murder, or whether the defendant has a "significant history of
felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence," or the victim was "involved, associated, or in competition with the defendant" regarding drugs. 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d) (West 1997).
94. See Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 321 (The Philadelphia DA has stated, "I
don't care how many million it costs, given the billions wasted every year in large
cities. Please don't tell me about cost when talking about the rights of the victim. It's
not even a consideration. Whatever it costs is worth it.").
95. See id.
96. Id. at 320.
97. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
98. See id. at 282-83.
99. The "Baldus study" is a statistical study, proffered by Professors David C.
Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth, that attempts to demonstrate "a
disparity in the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia based on the race of the
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tered its sentencing process in a racially discriminatory manner. 00
In one of its models, the study concluded that defendants charged
with the murder of white victims were 4.3 times as likely to be subject to the death penalty as defendants charged with murdering African-Americans.101 The model also concluded that AfricanAmericans were 1.1 times as likely to have
the death penalty im102
defendants.
other
as
them
against
posed
The Supreme Court determined that the statistical evidence did
not prove that the decision-makers in the defendant's case acted
with discriminatory intent.0 3 As such, the Court concluded that
the study failed to show that the death penalty was administered in
a racially discriminatory manner.0 4 Unlike other limited contexts
where statistics alone are sufficient proof of intent to discriminate, 0 5 the Court noted that the decision to seek the death penalty
rests upon "innumerable factors that vary according to the characteristics of the individual defendant and the facts of the particular
capital offense.' 0 6 Thus, because of the essential role discretion
plays in the criminal justice process, the Court requires "exception0 7
ally clear proof" to draw an inference of abuse of discretion.
Regardless of the outcome of McCleskey, there is legitimate concern regarding the influence of race on the decision whether to
seek the death penalty. In 1990, Congress' General Accounting
Office released a review of death sentencing research that concluded that there is "a pattern of evidence indicating racial disparities in the charging, the sentencing, and the imposition of the death
0 8
penalty after the Furman decision.'
murder victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant." Id. at 286. The study
reviewed more than 2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia in the 1970's and
took 230 variables into account "that could have explained the disparities on nonracial grounds." Id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 287.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 297.
104. See id. at 293-97.
105. The Court has accepted statistical evidence to prove intent to discriminate in
the context of "an equal protection violation in the selection of a jury," id. at 293, and
to prove "statutory violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id. at
294.
106. Id. The relationship of the statistics to the capital sentencing decision are
"fundamentally different from corresponding elements in the venire-selection or Title
VII cases." Id.
107. Id. at 297.
108. U.S. GENERAL AccoUrrrlNo OFFICE, Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates Pattern of Racial Disparities,in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT
CONTROVERSIEs 271 (1990). The study summarized its synthesis of other studies as
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2. The Influence of Class on the Decision Whether to Seek the
Death Penalty
Although the socioeconomic status of a defendant should have
no influence upon the determination of whether that defendant is
put to death, 10 9 this status influences the whole death penalty process because indigent defendants typically are defended by attorneys with neither the skills, resources nor commitment to litigate
death penalty cases. 110 When competent representation by the attorney is lacking, the "most fundamental component of the adversary system" is absent, and the process of determining who should
be subject to the death penalty fails."' This results in the arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty," 2 as it is imposed "not upon those
who commit the worst crimes, but upon those who have the misfortune to be assigned the worst lawyers. "113
supporting "a strong race of victim influence." Id. at 272. "The race of offender influence is not as clear cut and varies across a number of dimensions." Id.
109. See Douglas W. Vick, PoorhouseJustice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BuFF.L. REV. 329, 459 (1995) ("The effects of
resource deprivation pervade the entire process of determining who shall be chosen
to die for their crimes, manifesting itself more dramatically in the pretrial investigation and legal research that goes undone, and in the expert assistance that is never
provided. It can be said with confidence that most indigent defendants who have
been sentenced to death received severely substandard discretion, and that this pattern will continue unless the courts intercede.").
110. See Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 17, at 275 ("It is not the facts of
the crime, but the quality of the legal representation, that distinguish" cases "where
the death penalty is imposed, from many similar cases where it is not."). See LEwis E.
LAWES, LIFE AND DEATH IN SING SING 155-60 (1928, foreword by Adolph Lewisohn)
("[The death penalty] is an unequal punishment in the way it is applied to the rich and
to the poor. The defendant of wealth and position never goes to the electric chair or
the gallows. Juries do not intentionally favour the rich, the law is theoretically impartial, but the defendant with ample means is able to have his case presented with every
favorable aspect, while the poor defendant often has a lawyer assigned by the
court."); Furman,408 U.S. at 251 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("One searches our chronicles in vain for the execution of any member of the affluent strata of this society.").
Cf B. PRETrYMAN, JR., DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT 296-97 (1961) ("The problem of proper representation is not a problem of money, as some have claimed, but of
a lawyer's ability, and it is not true that only the rich have able lawyers. Both the rich
and the poor usually are well represented-the poor because more often than not the
best attorneys are appointed to defend them. It is the middle class defendant, who
can afford to hire an attorney but not a very good one, who is at a disadvantage.").
111. Bright, Councel for the Poor, supra note 17.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 303. "In sum, resource deprivation of defense services for the poor is
among the most significant factors influencing the outcome of death penalty cases."
Vick, supra note 109, at 412.
The literature regarding the effect of class upon the imposition of the death penalty
focuses upon the effect of less than satisfactory representation on a defendant's
chance of having the death penalty imposed upon him or her. See Vick, supra note
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The Influence of Gender on the Decision Whether to Seek the
Death Penalty

In his concurrence in Furman v. Georgia, Justice Marshall noted
that there was "overwhelming evidence" that the death penalty is
'
utilized "against men and not women."114
In 1990, for example,
only 30 of the 2,347 death row inmates were women.11 5 Moreover,
even though one out of every eight persons arrested for murder is a
woman, 11617a mere one out of a hundred is a death row inmate. 17
The execution of a woman is such an anomalous event' 18 that it
fuels the perception that there is a reluctance to sentence women
to death that may be based, in part, upon a notion of chivalry. 119
The events surrounding the execution of Karla Faye Tucker provide support for this perception. Karla Faye Tucker was convicted
of murdering two sleeping victims with a three-foot pick-ax 12 0 -a
crime described as one of "the most lurid" in the history of Hous-

109, at 459; Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 17, at 275. There is little accompanying research regarding whether a defendant's class has a significant effect on the
decision whether to seek the death penalty. For example, whether a district attorney
would seek the death penalty against a poor defendant with appointed representation
rather than a wealthy defendant capable of hiring a prominent defense attorney to
handle the matter. Regardless, the effect that a defendant's wealth has upon the likelihood of the imposition of the death penalty warrant that every measure be employed to limit those against whom the death penalty is sought to those who truly
deserve it. This is necessary because of the disproportionate imposition of the death
penalty upon the poor. Moreover, if it is shown that the defendant's class does impermissibly influence the decision, it provides even more reason to impose additional
controls over the decision.
114. Furman, 408 U.S. at 365 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
115. See Elizabeth Rapaport, Some Questions About Gender and the Death Penalty,

20

GOLDEN GATE

116.
MENT

U. L.

REV.

501, 503 (1990).

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISH-

1988, at 9 (1989).

117. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 46 (2d ed. 1988).
118. Only two women have been executed since 1976. See Sam Howe Verhovek,
Texas, in First Time in 135 Years, Is Set To Execute Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1998,
at Al. During that time period, 434 men have been executed. See id.
119. See Rapaport, supra note 115, at 504 ("The rarity of women on death row and
the cultural anomalousness of executing women inevitably fuels speculation about
whether female murderers receive favorable treatment in sentencing. Prima facie, the
grave disparity between the risk of execution faced by men and women suggests that
American society is possessed of a chivalrous disinclination to sentence women to
die.").
120. Sam Howe Verhovek, As Woman's Execution Nears, Texas Squirms, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998, at A12.
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ton, Texas. 2 ' There was little doubt about her guilt or whether she
was responsible for her conduct. She confessed to the two
murders. 122 She was an adult who was neither mentally ill nor retarded at the time of the murders. 23 Moreover, she showed no
remorse following the murders, as she "boasted ... that she had
experienced a surge
of sexual pleasure every time she swung the 324
foot pick-ax.'

Despite the egregious nature of her crime, there was a call for
Texas Governor George W. Bush and the Texas Board of Pardons
25
and Paroles to commute her death sentence to life in prison.
Those who called for clemency argued that she no longer was "the
drug-addicted murderer of 14 years ago, ' ' 26 but rather, she had become a born-again Christian127 committed to a prison-based ministry that strove to prevent young individuals from becoming
criminals. 28 Many men, however, have undergone similar 1trans29
formations without any accompanying clamor for clemency.
While further research is required to reliably ascertain whether
favorable prejudice accounts for the paucity of women on death
row, one scholar argues that the reason that women rarely are sentenced to death is not because of gender discrimination in their
favor, but rather, because women rarely commit the types of murder that are subject to the death penalty. 3 ' Given the lack of research on this topic, however, any conclusions regarding the role of
gender in the decision whether to
seek the death penalty amount to
3
nothing more than conjecture.1 '
121. See id. at A14 ("Strung out with her boyfriend on a variety of drugs, [Karla
Faye Tucker] repeatedly assaulted the sleeping victims with the murder weapon, [and]
left it embedded in [a victim's] chest .... ").
122. See Editorial, When the Murderer Is a Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1998, at
A14.
123. See id.
124. Verhovek, supra note 120, at A12.
125. See Editorial, supra note 122, at A14.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. See Verhovek, supra note 120, at A12.
129. See Editorial, supra note 122, at A14.
130. See Rapaport, supra note 115, at 510. Over ninety-five percent of those convicted of violent crimes are male, typically a factor in favor of the availability of the
death sentence. See id. at 509-10. In addition, approximately eighty percent of death
row inmates were convicted of felony murder. See id. at 509. Women, however, comprise only six percent of those suspected of committing felony murder. See id. Also,
while women commit "intra-family" homicides nearly as frequently as men, these offenses are very seldom subject to the death penalty. Id. at 509-10.
131. See Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Female Offenders, U. CIN. L. REv. 845,
878 (1990). However, if it is indeed true that women receive beneficial discrimination
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The Effect of Improper PoliticalInfluence and Subjective
Judgments on the Decision Whether to Seek the Death
Penalty

As elected officials, prosecutors are concerned about their political well-being. 132 District attorneys deciding whether to seek the
death penalty have the opportunity to state their intentions during
press conferences, and to be seen on television while in the courtroom arguing a case.' 33 Because potential death penalty cases
place prosecutors in the limelight,134 there is some concern that
media attention focused on these cases may be sought for political
advantage. 35
Death penalty decisions also provide platforms for political foes.
For example, a failure to seek the death penalty would give opponents an opportunity to broadcast charges from a victim's family
that the prosecutor is "soft on crime" and thus damage the district
attorney's public support. 36 Although allowing political considerations to affect the decision whether to seek the death penalty

in this context, it only strengthens the argument for controls over the imposition of
the death penalty.
132. See Hancock et al., supra note 16, at 1563 ("[P]rosecutors are elected officials
potentially subject to the pressures of public opinion."); Vorenberg, supra note 18, at
1558 (stating that prosecutors are subject to political influence "largely but not solely"
because they are elected).
133. See Bright et al., Death Penalty supra note 18, at 286 ("Trying death cases has
helped the prosecutor get in front of the community. They call press conferences and
announce they are going for the death penalty. Cameras in the court means that they
are on television all during the trial, calling and arguing for the death penalty.").
134. See id at 286 (discussing how seeking the death penalty is politically beneficial
to a prosecutor).
135. See Vorenberg, supra note 18, at 1558 ("One must worry that political influences will enter into the decisions prosecutors make and that they may deal harshly or
gently with particular individuals for political reasons."); Bright et al., Death Penalty,
supra note 18, at 286 (Even if a death penalty decision is reversed because of
prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor can still benefit by calling a press conference
and discussing, for example, "how the federal judges were hysterical, emotional, and
personally opposed to the death penalty, and announced that he would seek the death
penalty again.").
136. Wise, supra note 18.
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clearly is inappropriate,'13 7 it is extremely difficult to prove that
these considerations have affected the decision.' 38
In addition to its vulnerability to improper political considerations, a district attorney's decision to seek the death penalty is
fraught with subjective judgments. 13 9 It is an unavoidable outcome
of prosecutorial discretion that the decision whether to seek the
death penalty will be influenced by the particular "philosophical,
ethical, religious or other views" of a district attorney.140 For example, a prosecutor may dislike certain offenses or offenders for
personal reasons, and the prosecutor may vary leniency on this baaccounted for in
sis. 1 This creates a dangerous possibility "not'1 42
the assumption of rational, autonomous actors.

II.

Previously Proffered Controls of the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion
It is fair to assume that prosecutors are professionals who take
their jobs seriously,'43 and will attempt to avoid the political damage that would accompany the exposure of improper charging
practices.' 44 However, these assumptions are not sufficient to pro137. "In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no weight to
the personal or political advantages or disadvantages which might be involved or to a
desire to enhance his or her record of convictions." ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE ADMIN. OF CRIM.JUST., The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-3.9 (3rd ed. 1992).
These Standards reflect "the considered judgment of... a broad spectrum of prominent prosecutors, defense counsel, judges, and law professors as to appropriate, modern prosecutorial ethics." John M. Burkoff, ProsecutorialEthics: The Duty Not "To
Strike Foul Blows," 53 U. PiTT. L. REV. 271, 288 (1992).
138. See Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard,supra note 23, at 513 n.2 ("[T]he
doctrines of selective, vindictive, and bad faith prosecutions provide modest constraints on the prosecutor's charging power."); Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pir. L. REV. 393, 441 (1992) ("[T]here is a presumption that the
prosecutor acts in good faith, and overcoming that presumption is almost never successful.") [hereinafter Gershman, The New Prosecutors].
139. See Hankcock et al., supra note 16, at 1563.
140. Id.
141. See Vorenberg, supra note 18, at 1553.
142. Id. Vorenberg also argues that obtaining information and leniency in sentencing should not be a justification for prosecutorial discretion because these cases represent a small percentage of those in which plea bargaining is used. See id. at 1552-53.
143. Prosecutors are professionals who take their responsibilities seriously. Pizzi,
supra note 16, at 1336-37. Generally, if a district attorney wishes to be re-elected, the
district attorney has a powerful incentive to run a "professional office" because that
district attorney must defend the office's record and the manner in which discretion
was employed to the local constituents. Id. at 1338, 1344. This involves making fair
charging decisions, and ensuring that prosecutors in the office charge similar crimes in
a similar manner. See id. at 1344.
144. See id. at 1345 (A controversy caused by the manner in which a discretion is
exercised in an office could damage the district attorney's chances of re-election.
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tect against the potential for arbitrariness and influence of bias inherent in the death penalty decision, 45 particularly in light of the
great deference granted prosecutors by the judiciary. 146 As a result
of this situation, authors have proffered four primary controls to
check or limit the use of prosecutorial discretion: internal controls, 147 legislative controls 148 judicial controls'4 9 and administrative
controls. 15 °
While this means that prosecutors are politically influenced, this form of political influence is distinct from improper political considerations because these focus upon the
process used to reach a decision rather than altering an individual decision to gain
political advantage or avoid political disadvantage.).
145. See Vorenberg, supra note 18, at 1560, 1562 ("It is illusory ... to assume that
prosecutorial discretion makes the system more efficient and effective in controlling
crime. Instead, it subverts the processes of accountability and oversight that are essential to the improvement of the criminal justice system. * * * [T]he key to narrowing discretion is to make prosecutors accountable for their decisions.").
146. See supra Part I.B.
147. See generally Abrams, supra note 37, at 7-58; DAVIs, supra note 20, at 102-03,
143-44, Pizzi, supra note 16, at 1344-45, 1363-72; Vorenberg, supra note 18, at 1543-45,
1562-66.
148. See generally DAVIS, supra note 20, at 45-46, 56, 69, 146-47; Vorenberg, supra
note 18, at 1564-68.
149. See generally DAVIS, supra note 20, at 151-61, 207-14; Vorenberg, supra note
18, at 1568-72.
150. See generally John A. Horowitz, Note, ProsecutorialDiscretion and the Death
Penalty: Creatinga Committee to Decide Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 FORDHAM

L.

REV.

2571, 2600-10 (1997).

Gubernatorial supersedure also has been utilized to control prosecutorial discretion
in the context of the decision whether to seek the death penalty. It is not widely
utilized, however, as only New York and Colorado have statutes providing for gubernatorial supersedure of district attorneys. For example, Colorado has granted its governor great discretion in superseding district attorneys at the local level. See COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-31-101(1)(a) (1988) (The attorney general "shall appear for the
state and prosecute and defend all actions and proceedings, civil and criminal, in
which the state is a party or is interested when required to do so by the governor, and
he shall prosecute and defend for the state all causes in the appellate courts in which
the state is a party or interested."). Under Colorado law, this discretion is vested only
with the governor, as the supersedure of a district attorney can only be based upon
the governor's order. See id. See also People ex rel. Witcher v. District Court, 549 P.2d
778, 779-80 (Colo. 1976) (en banc) (quoting People v. Gibson, 125 P. 531, 536 (Colo.
1912)) ("[W]hen the Governor... requires the attorney general to prosecute a criminal case in which the state is a party, he becomes to all intents and purposes the
district attorney, and may in his own name and-official capacity exercise all the powers of such officer, for he is then, and in that case, the public prosecutor. Being authorized and empowered to appear and prosecute, he can do each and everything
essential to prosecute in accordance with the law of the land ....").
In New York, the governor's power to supersede a district attorney is well established. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. On the rare occasion that a New
York governor has exercised this power, Pitler, supra note 7, at 517, the use has been
based upon the "nature of the problem," the governor's "view of the nature of executive power and its relation to the needs of the local community ...." Id. at 522.
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A.

Internal Controls

Internal guidelines generally involve the promulgation of policy
statements that guide the exercise of decision-making within a particular prosecutor's office. 151 The goal of internal guidelines is to
promote consistent prosecutorial decision-making by providing
each prosecutor with some notion of the criteria that others employ.152 This can be accomplished by creating guidelines that set
out factors to be considered in a comprehensive and detailed
1 53
manner.
Internal guidelines generally do not encroach on a prosecutor's
decisional autonomy.' 54 Typically, prosecutors' offices have an unofficial system of internal controls in order to provide inexperienced prosecutors with guidance and supervision from experienced
Despite the general acceptance of the governor's supersedure power, there are serious questions regarding the appropriateness of its use in the context of a district attorney's decision whether to seek the death penalty. One scholar has argued that a
governor should show considerable restraint when exercising the power, especially
"where party or local politics" are at issue. Id. See also id. ("One constant pattern has
been a fairly general reluctance to issue an executive order of superseder where party
or local politics was involved. The power of superseder has been used rarely, and
such is its design."). Moreover, the utilization of gubernatorial supersedure to control
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the decision whether to seek the death penalty is fraught with dangers because it amounts, essentially, to the "self-appointed
transfer of discretion from one individual to another." Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 241
(Smith, J., dissenting).
151. See Abrams, supra note 37, at 25-26, 57; Theodora Galacatos, Note, The
United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section: A Case Study of
Inter- and Intrabranch Conflict Over Congressional Oversight And the Exercise of
ProsecutorialDiscretion, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 587, 643 (1995) ("Internal controls
include formal guidelines, official memoranda, and public or nonpublic policy
statements.").
152. See Abrams, supra note 37, at 7, 57 (stating that internal guidelines can, "at the
very least, narrow the range of considerations deemed relevant and channel the thinking of all prosecutors working within the same prosecutorial system toward the same
elements. This will not insure absolute uniformity of the decision, but it should move
the prosecutorial system further along the road to 'tolerable consistency.'").
153. See id. at 57 ("[I]t is both feasible and desirable to develop comprehensive and
detailed policy statements governing the exercise of prosecutorial decision-making
and . . . prosecutorial resources should be allocated to talk of developing such
policy.").
154. See Pizzi, supra note 16, at 1345. This informal system usually involves a
scheme of guidelines or policies, or a scheme of direct review of charging decisions, or
mixture of the two. Id. Informal internal guidelines are often used to prevent "scandal." Id. In addition, they are used to ensure that charging decisions will be decided
similarly. See id. When a jurisdiction must process a high number of cases, it is much
easier to accomplish if all the actors in the process-the prosecutors, "defense lawyers[,] and judges"-understand the general policies of a particular district attorney's
office. Id.
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prosecutors.55 As prosecutors already have accepted a form of internal guidelines, the arguments against their utilization generally
focus on their ineffectiveness, rather than their degree of intrusion
into decisional autonomy. For example, one author argues that because of the need to preserve the hierarchical relationship between
superior officers and their subordinates, 56 the superior officer's examination of a subordinate's decision may not be decided solely on
the merits, thus the effectiveness of the guidelines would be undermined.' 57 It also is asserted that it would be impossible to draft a
set of guidelines that could anticipate every conceivable situation
that might occur.' 58 In addition, it is argued that internal guidelines currently do not control prosecutorial discretion effectively
because instead of eliminating discretion completely, they only
exercise of discretion upward 159 to higher
push the unreviewable
60
ranking prosecutors.
Unlike the implementation of internal guidelines, the actual publication of these guidelines could lead to significant controversy regarding the effect that the outside examination of prosecutorial
policies could have on the administration of the criminal justice
system. Prosecutors generally object to the publication of internal
controls because they fear that if an office's policy is lenient towards certain offenses, it would appear as if the office was "'soft'
on crime.' 6 1 Prosecutors also fear that published guidelines would
155. See id.
156. See DAVIS, supra note 20, at 144 (A superior officer "often has official, psychological, or personal reasons for protecting that relation ... .
157. See id. at 144-45.
158. Pizzi, supra note 16, at 1368; Gershman, A Moral Standard, supra note 23, at
519, 520 ("[Internal] guidelines could not be sufficiently explicit to regulate
prosecutorial discretion in fact-specific cases."). Guidelines are a "starting point" to
control the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, but they "cannot and should not eliminate" it. Id. The difficulties inherent in attempting to draft such a set of guidelines
are exhibited by the ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice. See Pizzi, supra note 16, at 1369; ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN.
OF CRIM. JUST., The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-3.9 (3rd ed. 1992). The ABA
standards rule essentially affords "general guidance" for the manner in which a prosecutor should exercise discretion, but, in the end, reaffirms the notion that prosecutors
have extensive discretion. See Pizzi, supra note 20, at 1369. The rule neither attempts
to "exhaust" the factors a prosecutor may contemplate in determining how to exercise
discretion, nor does it indictate the manner in which the listed factors should be
weighed against each other when they lead to different conclusions. Id. at 1369-70.
159. See Vorenberg, supra note 18, at 1545.
160. See id.
161. The appearance that the prosecutor is "'soft' on crime" could evoke an issue
that is politically damaging. Pizzi, supra note 16, at 1365. See also Wise, supra note
18.
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become "litigation weapons" with which individual prosecutorial
decisions could be attacked. 162 Moreover, even if publication was
allowed, a prosecutor's desire to maintain as much flexibility as
possible for unusual cases would likely result in guidelines that are
the greatest amount
"hedged with general exceptions" to maintain
163
of flexibility for departures from the policy.
One proponent of the publication of internal guidelines argues
that the publication of prosecutorial policy will subject a prosecutor's decision-making to outside examination and, therefore, to
"scrutiny, evaluation, and criticism. '164 It is argued that this scrutiny and criticism will lead prosecutors to both exercise a greater
degree of care in the formulation of policy, 165 and to revise and
improve policy. 1 66 Moreover, it is argued that the secrecy inherent
in the non-publication of prosecutorial policy, and the lack of accountability that accompanies it, invites corruption, irrationality,
and discrimination in decision-making. 67 However, because a
storm of controversy engulfs the decision to seek the death penalty, 68 one advocate of published prosecutorial guidelines con162. For example, if a district attorney's office had a policy to be lenient on firsttime offenders, but a prosecutor within that office decided to prosecute a first-time
offender despite that policy., the defendant might attempt to challenge the decision to
prosecute in court because it conflicts with office policy. See Pizzi, supra note 16, at
1364-66 (discussing how published guidelines could be turned into litigation weapons). The publication of internal guidelines would likely result in guidelines that are
"hedged with general exceptions" to assure that the greatest amount of flexibility for
departures from the policy is maintained. See id. at 1367.
163. See id.
164. Abrams, supra note 37, at 27; SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF
CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION

25 (1982) (arguing that secrecy can harm those that

utilize it by preventing "criticism and feedback," eventually leading individuals to "erroneous beliefs and ways of thinking").
165. See Abrams, supra note 37, at 27.
166. See id.
167. See BOK, supra note 164, at 106 ("[S]ecrecy carries some risk of corruption
and irrationality; if [individuals] dispose of greater than ordinary power over others,
and if this power is exercised in secret, with no accountability to those whom it affects,
the invitation to abuse is great."). Discrimination is pershaps the most problematic
consequence of secrecy. See also id. at 109-10 (Collective secrecy leads to other dangers, including "discrimination ... between insider and outsider, between those set
apart and all others. Such discrimination is one thing when it sets an individual apart
as unique and protects his privacy. It is quite another thing for a group. The criteria
selected for inclusion or exclusion may then lead to discriminatory action toward
those excluded-on racial grounds, perhaps, or on sexual, political, or religious
ones.").
168. The controversy that the decision to seek the death penalty causes can be
summed up as follows:
Defenders of the death penalty believe that despite needless expense and
avoidable delay, capital punishment as actually administered does a reason-
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cedes that publication should not be required under such politically
likely would hinder the forsensitive circumstances, 169 because it 170
mulation of the death penalty policy.
B.

Legislative Controls

One author asserts that legislative bodies should take an "affirm171
ative obligation to ensure that the laws it enacts are enforced."
The author argues that this can be accomplished through "vigorous
oversight" of prosecutors that involves the sharing of information
concerning "law enforcement strategies and the development of
prosecutorial criteria. 1 72 Another author contends that prosecutors should be required by law to issue both guidelines for making
decisions and reports summarizing the analysis used to reach these
decisions.

1 73

able (not perfect) job of winnowing out the worst and most dangerous offenders from among the bad-and that an even better job would be done if
the laws were changed to abolish frivolous appeals and to reduce costs and
the pileup on the nation's death rows. Opponents of the death penalty disagree; they argue that the present system is but the latest version of death
penalty practices that cannot be justified, that no significant improvements
are likely, and that moral and practical objections to the death penalty ought
therefore to prevail.
BEDAU, supra note 2, at 24. These opposing views arise whenever the death penalty is
sought, but they become particularly heated when a high-profile, highly controversial
case is involved. For example, the supersedure of the Bronx DA by Governor Pataki
was described as an "unprecedented feud over politics, principles, and the law."
Rachel L. Swarms, Governor Removes Bronx Prosecutorfrom Murder Case, N.Y.

TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at Al. This "unprecedented feud" was carried out via faxes,
press conferences, and even before a national audience on the "Today" show. See id.
Another example of the controversy that can occur is provided by the recent execution of Karla Faye Tucker, which caused an intense nationwide debate regarding the
death penalty. See B. Drummond Ayres, Death Penalty Support Declines After Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1998, at A5.

169. See Abrams, supra note 37, at 33.
170. "Undoubtedly a requirement of publication of policy relating to controversial
and politically sensitive matters will inhibit the formulation of such policies. But it
may be necessary to recognize that sometimes publication of policy will arouse. undeniable controversy and therefore should not occur." Abrams, supra note 37, at 33.
The basis for nonpublication should not, however, be utilized by prosecutors to undermine a requirement of publication under general circumstances. See id. Abrams
thus argues that "the burden should be placed on those who oppose it to justify nonpublication in the particular case." Id.
171. Galacatos, supra note 151, at 647 (citing Vorenberg, supra note 18, at 1558).
172. Id. (citing Vorenberg, supra note 18, at 1567).
173. Vorenberg, supra note 18, at 1566. The basis of the argument for the utilization of legislative controls to limit prosecutorial discretion is that individuals that have
power are necessarily reluctant to voluntarily relinquish that power, and thus the individuals must be statutorily forced to do so. See id. at 1564-65 (arguing that few prosecutors' offices would promulgate guidelines that effectively limit their power unless
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Opponents of legislative controls object to their utilization based
upon a fear of the politicization of the prosecutorial decision-making process, 7 4 and the disclosure of law enforcement documents
and policies. 175 One proponent of legislative controls, however, argues that any concerns about the confidentiality of ongoing investigations and law enforcement strategies could be accommodated. 76
For example, sensitive information could be examined in non-public hearings. 177 Another believes that it should be feasible to effectuate general legislative "oversight"' 178 over case management
without offending law enforcement concerns. 79 However, one oprequired by the legislature); DAVIS, supra note 20, at 224 (noting the "seeming unanimity of American prosecutors that their discretionary power must be completely
uncontrolled"). This is especially true given the degree to which discretion has become engrained in the professional role of prosecutors. See also id. at 191 (noting
how "deeply embedded" the belief is that a prosecutor's discretion must be uncontrolled). Cf Gershman, A Moral Standard, supra note 23, at 519 ("[A]n institutional
reluctance to unduly restrict their own discretion makes it even more unlikely that
prosecutors would promulgate overly specific guidelines.").
174. See Galacatos, supra note 151, at 632 ("Legislators because of their susceptibility to political pressures should have no voice in such deliberations.") (citing Benjamin R. Civiletti, Justice Unbalanced: Congress and Prosecutorial Discretion, Address
Before The Heritage Foundation (Aug. 19, 1993)).
175. See Ronald L. Claveloux, Note, The Conflict Between Executive Privilege and
Congressional Oversight: The Gorsuch Controversy, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1333, 1348

(1983) (Officials feared that law enforcement efforts and litigation would be stymied
if lists of potential witnesses, available evidence, anticipated defenses and legal issues
were disclosed.); Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L.

461, 511 (1987) (The United States Department of Justice rationales for the nondisclosure of ongoing investigative files include "forestalling political influence over
the conduct of an investigation, preventing the disclosure of investigative sources and
methods, protecting the privacy of innocent parties named in investigative files, protecting the safety of confidential informants, and maintaining the appearance of 'integrity, impartiality and fairness of the law enforcement process as a whole.').
176. See Galacatos, supra note 151, at 647 (citing Vorenberg, supra note 18, at 1567)
("Advocates of such reforms further argue that vigorous oversight can accommodate
concerns for confidentiality of sensitive information regarding targets and pending
cases and the need to keep law enforcement strategies secret.").
177. Galacatos, supra note 151, at 639.
178. Vorenberg argues that "[o]versight does not involve separation-of-powers issues that arise when the legislative branch seeks information or control relating to
particular prosecutions. It is appropriate for the legislature to exercise general oversight; because prosecutorial power can nullify or vary legislative policy, the legislature
is entitled to information about how that power is exercised." Vorenberg, supra note
18, at 1567 n.146.
179. See id. For example, legislative committees could create an "annual reporting
format, requiring clear depiction" of the manner in which discretion is utilized and
explanations for divergence from usual patterns. Id. This annual reporting format
could include "summaries, without individual identification," of the manner in which
cases are handled on an individual basis. Id. This review would play an integral part
in ensuring that prosecutors are not acting in contravention of "legislative policy." Id.
REV.
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ponent of legislative controls counters that legislators may have
neither the time, the expertise, nor the inclination necessary to ef80
fectuate anything more than general formulations.1
C. Judicial Controls
Judicial controls over prosecutorial discretion are the least likely
controls to be implemented because the doctrine of separation of
powers prohibits the review of a prosecutor's exercise of discretion
by the judiciary.'
Despite this widely recognized policy, it has
180. See DAvIs, supra note 20, at 46. "Legislators and their staffs know their own
limitations, they know they are ill-equipped to plan detailed programs, and they know
that administrators and their staffs are better equipped because they can work continuously for long periods in limited areas." Id. at 56. First, a legislator and the legislator's staff have "limited confidence" in their ability-in the time available-to
develop an excellent understanding of a specialized subject matter, and this "state of
mind" results in "general and vague formulations" of purposes. Id. Second, the creation of policies regarding complex subject matter is often best accomplished by contemplating each "concrete problem" as it presents itself. Id. Any attempt to
generalize in advance effectively is usually "beyond the capacity of the best minds."
Id. Third, subject matter involving delegation is usually "highly controversial." Id.
Consequently, the more specific the statement of legislative purpose, the more arduous the attempt to gain a consensus that will muster enough support for passage;
however, the "more vague and general" the statement of legislative purpose, the
more likely it is that a consensus will be achieved. Id. Thus, the most qualified authorities to confine the exercise of prosecutorial discretion are the prosecutors themselves, who are "clearly in the best position to act" because they have "the most direct
knowledge of practical needs" regarding the exercise of this discretion. Id. at 69. As
evidence, one need look no further than the "brutal unfairness" that can result from
imposed guidelines such as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Pizzi, supra note 16, at
368. Moreover, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is much more complex than
the discretion employed by the judiciary, which rather complicates matters. Id.
181. See Vorenberg, supra note 18, at 1546 ("Courts often justify their refusal to
review prosecutorial discretion on the ground that separation-of-powers concerns
prohibit such review."). "Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the
exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute
criminal proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to dismiss a
proceeding once brought." Newman, 382 F.2d at 480. "Put bluntly, except in the narrow band of cases where a prosecutor's actions violates the Constitution, an American
judge has no power to reduce or reshape criminal charges to fit the evidence or the
equities of a particular case." Pizzi, supra note 16, at 1351.
For example, in State v. Bloom, 497 So.2d 2 (1986), the Supreme Court of Florida
specifically addressed whether it was appropriate for a judge to determine, before
trial, whether the death penalty should be sought in a particular case. 497 So.2d at 2.
In Bloom, a defendant who was charged with first-degree murder moved to preclude
the prosecution from seeking the death penalty. See id. at 3. The defendant argued
that the state "lacked sufficient evidence" to impose the death penalty in the case. Id.
The circuit judge granted this motion, and directed the prosecution to "proceed with
the first-degree murder trial as a non-capital case." Id. The prosecution appealed,
asserting that the circuit judge did not have the authority to determine the appropriateness of the decision to seek the death penalty in a case before trial. See id. The
prosecution argued that the circuit judge's ruling "unconstitutionally infringe[d] ... an
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been argued that reliance upon the separation of powers doctrine
is misguided because, unlike the time when the doctrine first was
developed, judicial review of administrative discretion currently is
allowed.182 Today, courts review executive action to guard against
abuses of administrative discretion while avoiding assumption of
executive power.'83 Moreover, it is argued that because there is a
stronger need for judicial review of the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion than that for administrative discretion - as abuse by
prosecutors is prevalent, injustice could be prevented, the issues
are suitable for judicial review, and significant interests are involved-it is even more critical that judicial controls be
84
implemented.1
Opponents of judicial controls note two practical problems with
their adoption. First, given the confined scope of review that likely
would be applied to prosecutorial decision-making, 85 and considering the lack of general standards to guide courts, 86 judges are
likely to be extremely hesitant to overturn a prosecutor's decision
whether to prosecute unless the abuse is "extreme."'1 87 Even if
there were general standards to guide the courts, judicial review
would add "a whole new layer of pretrial review that dwarfs any of
the efficiencies that guidelines can achieve.' 88 Second, to ask a
judge to review charging decisions is diametrically opposed to the
traditional role of judges in the adversarial system, in which judges
executive function exclusively within a prosecutor's discretion." See id. The Florida

Supreme Court held that the circuit judge had "no authority to interfere with the
prosecutor's discretion in proceeding with this cause as a death penalty case." Id. In
reaching this decision, the court noted the great deference granted prosecutor's in the

exercise of their discretion. See id. The court also noted that allowing a judge to
determine, before trial, whether it was appropriate to seek the death penalty in a
particular case would modify the procedure implemented by Florida's death penalty
statute. See id.

182.

DAVIs,

supra note 20, at 229 (arguing that this assumption should be re-ex-

amined given the modern view that courts can review executive decisions "to protect
against abuses while at the same time avoiding judicial assumptions of executive
power").
183. See id. There is an "enormous difference" between making a prosecutor seek
prosecution or charge a suspect and regulating that authority. Vorenberg, supra note
18, at 1546.
184. See DAVIS, supra note 20, at 211-12; Vorenberg, supra note 18, at 1546 (Judicial review of executive action is commonly performed in the context of administrative discretion, however, the interests at stake in criminal prosecution are much
greater, and thus the basis for judicial review of prosecutorial discretion is stronger
than in the administrative arena.).
185. See Abrams, supra note 37, at 51.
186. See id.
187. Id.
188. Pizzi, supra note 16, at 1366.
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maintain a "neutral and passive role" regarding "charging decisions and the development of evidence at trial. ' 189 Unless one is
prepared to alter this role, it is an inescapable reality that judicial
review of a prosecutor's decision will be a mere "formality."190
D.

Administrative Controls

One student author proffered a provocative alternative check on
prosecutorial discretion in the form of a legislatively enacted administrative death penalty committee. 191 In support of his proposition, the author asserts that previous solutions "fail[ed] to solve all
' and
of the discretionary problems present in the capital context," 192

argues that the dangers inherent in prosecutorial discretion warrant the removal of prosecutors from participating in the decision
whether to seek the death penalty. 93
The author further contends that removing a district attorney
from the decision to seek the death penalty and vesting the decision with a committee will increase both the legitimacy of the deci189. Id. at 1353.
190. Id. at 1353-54 (questioning whether a judge would review a case with a prosecutor, and, if so, whether there would be an ex parte proceeding, or whether the defendant would be represented by counsel).
191. Horowitz, supra note 150, at 2571.
192. Id. at 2600.
193. Id. The author argues for a legislatively enacted administrative death penalty
committee. See id. Each county would have a different committee, comprised of
seven members, that would determine whether to seek the death penalty. See id. The
composition of the committee would be determined by the governor, the district attorney, and the members of the panel itself. See id. at 2601-02. The governor and the
county's district attorney would each appoint three committee members, and the remaining member would be selected by the other six members of the committee. See
id. Each member of the committee would remain on the committee as long as the
person who appointed them remained in office. See id. at 2606-07. If an official left
office prior to the end of his or her term, the replacement would not be allowed to
appoint new members. See id. at 2607. This is because the replacement's appointments might not "accurately reflect the views of the electorate." See id.
In practice the death penalty committee would function as follows. The prosecutor
would decide when first degree murder was an appropriate charge, but at that point
the decision whether to seek the death penalty would be the committee's decision. See
id. After a "statutorily determined" period of time had passed, the prosecution and
the defense would present the results of their respective investigations to the committee. Id. "The committee would listen to arguments, review the evidence, request additional information if desired, and render a decision." Id. This decision would be based
upon a majority vote of the members and would be released to the public as a memorandum. See id. at 2601-02. The memorandum would explain the basis of the decision,
however, the specific votes of each member would remain anonymous. See id. After
the decision is rendered, the matter would be returned to the prosecutor's office for
prosecution, and the responsibility for all discretionary decisions is once again theirs.
See id. at 2602.
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sion-making process 194 and the "public accountability of the
decision-maker."' 95 The author argues this would result in a less
96 that avoids the discriminatory imposition of the
political decision
97
death penalty.1

Il.

An Overlooked Solution

Previously proffered controls over prosecutorial discretion fail
when employed individually. When useful, elements of these controls are employed collectively, however, the death penalty decision-making process is improved. Nevertheless, the exact form of
the control utilized must be chosen carefully to balance the competing concerns of maintaining uniform decision-making and relatively direct constituent control within the confines of district
attorneys' offices that vary widely in size.
194. Insulating the decision whether to seek the death penalty from political pressure protects the decision from "personal and political issues" that can impact it. See
id. at 2607. These issues include experiences from the past, "their relationship with
the defendant's attorney, political factors including a need to be tough on crime, or
personal revenge (e.g., the victim is a police officer, from the district attorney's office,
a family member, or a friend)." Id. at 2608. Even if one member of the committee has
a "personal agenda," the need for a majority vote will ensure that this bias will be
"unlikely to affect" the decision. Id. at 2607. The presence of a "moderate" member
appointed after the "negotiation" of the members, and not the result of a "political
mandate" further enhances the legitimacy of the decision. Id. at 2608. This ensures "a
thoughtful and even-handed decision" even if the governor and district attorney have
opposite views regarding the death penalty. Id.
195. Id. The use of a committee would lessen the "secrecy" of the decision and thus
increase the "accountability" of the decision-making process by publishing the reasons for decisions. See id. The publication of memoranda explaining the basis of their
decisions would provide a body of informal precedent to guide future decisions. See
id. at 2609. This would ensure uniformity in factually similar cases in each respective
county. See id.
196. The author argues that the creation of a committee empowered to decide
whether to seek the death penalty would allow politicians to "openly espouse their
views" without fear of later repercussions. Id. at 2606. This also would allow district
attorneys to voice their views without fear of supersedure, and thus lead to a more
informed electorate, resulting in a "functioning representative democracy." Id. The
utilization of a committee thus would ensure that the political process would remain
an important part of the decision whether to seek the death penalty. See id. The
decision, however, would be "one layer removed" from the political process because
members remain on the committee for as long as the person who appoints them remains in office. Id. Thus ensuring that "no member could be removed for refusing to
be a puppet for the person who appointed" the member, id. at 2606-07, and ensuring
that the committee members are "immune to public opinion." Id. at 2607.
197. The increase in accountability will better the "chances of preventing the discriminatory application of capital sentences" because there will be pressure on the
governor and the respective district attorney to ensure "minority representation" on
the committee. Id.

1999]
A.

DECISION TO SEEK THE DEATH PENALTY

797

A Critique of Previously Proffered Controls of the Exercise
of Prosecutorial Discretion

Internal, legislative, judicial and administrative controls each
have individual strengths and weaknesses when utilized as a means
to limit the exercise of discretion in the decision whether to seek
the death penalty. 198 While these controls are flawed individually,
198. In addition, there are problems inherent in the utilization of gubernatorial supersedure to as a control over the exercise of discretion in the context of the decision
to seek the death penalty. It is useful to use the Governor's supersedure of the Bronx
DA to illustrate these problems. The Governor's decision to supersede the Bronx DA
was based upon several reasons. Robert Johnson's rejection of the Governor's aides'
suggestion for compromise "convinced" the Governor and his aides that the Bronx
DA would never seek the death penalty, regardless of the circumstances, even though
he publicly stated he might. Dao, supra note 8, at B2. When this became clear, Governor Pataki feared that the death penalty law would be open to challenge because it
was not being consistently applied statewide. Johnson, No. 1714/96, slip op. at 12.
This concern is based upon a provision of the death penalty law which requires the
New York Court of Appeals to periodically review whether the death penalty is being
applied in similar ways across the state. Dao, supra note 8, at B2. Finally, there was a
degree of animosity at play in the Governor's quick decision. See id. There was a
consensus among the Pataki staff that Robert Johnson had been so "confrontational
and stubborn" that quick action was needed to "protect" the Governor's authority as
well as the death penalty. Id. On the basis of these concerns, the Governor removed
the Bronx DA before the statutorily provided 120 days had expired, because, if Johnson decided not to seek the death penalty, it could not be sought by any prosecutor
who took his place thereafter. See id.
The Governor apparently attempted to avoid this action by asking Robert Johnson
to tell him his decision in advance, but the Bronx DA refused. See id. Robert Johnson
did not dispute that Governor Pataki had made such proposals. See id. Rather, he
argued that the Governor had acted prematurely, for he had not ruled out the proposals his aides had offered. See id. Robert Johnson stated that "'[t]he Governor and his
staff, as they have throughout the process, they want the answers they want, when
they want them ... I couldn't do that and be true to my obligations as district attorney."' Id.
Despite the apparent reasonableness of the Governor's supersedure of the Bronx
DA, the use of this power as a means to control a district attorney's decision whether
to seek the death penalty is problematic for three principle reasons. First, there is no
effective political check on the unjustified use of supersedure. Second, the decision to
supersede a district attorney is highly political in nature. Third, supersedure vests the
discretion whether to seek the death penalty with the governor, a highly political office, while displacing a district attorney, who has expertise in the criminal justice system and is elected to make these types of discretionary judgments.
There is no judicial check upon gubernatorial supersedure of a district attorney for
failure to seek the death penalty. There is no judicial check because New York courts
have generally held that supersedure is not justiciable. See Johnson v. Pataki, 229
A.D.2d 242, 245-46, 655 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465-66 (1st Dep't 1997) (citing Mulroy v. Carey, 58 A.D.2d 207, 397 N.Y.S.2d 929 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 819, 373 N.E.2d
369, 402 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1977)) (The court queried "whether, in virtually any situation,
the courts could interfere without violating the doctrine of separation of powers" because the body politic and the Legislature had "adequate recourse," under the New
York Constitution, "to check any abuse of discretion." The New York Court of Ap-
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peals thereafter affirmed the decision "for the reasons stated," while leaving open
"whether in any or all circumstances the exercise of the executive power to supersede
an elected District Attorney would be beyond judicial review or correction in a direct
or collateral action .... "); Matter of Johnson v. Pataki, 91 N.Y.2d at 226, 691 N.E.2d
at 1007, 668 N.Y.S.2d at 983 (The New York Court of Appeals left open the possibility
that the gubernatorial supersedure may be reviewable.).
There is also no effective political check upon gubernatorial supersedure in this
context. In New York, Governor Pataki's embrace of the death penalty was a key to
his election. See James Dao, Death Penalty in New York Reinstated After 18 Years;
Pataki Sees Justice Served: A Vow Fulfilled, Law Takes Effect Sept. 1-Its Foes Promise a Court Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, Al, B5 (stating that by signing the
death penalty bill into law, Governor Pataki fulfilled a central campaign promise vital
to his election); Todd S. Purdum, Voters Cry: Enough, Mr. Cuomo! Governor's
Toughest Opponent was his Well-Known Self, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, Bit (One out
of five voters stated that the death penalty was the most important campaign issue.);
Jacques Steinberg, Suburbs Give Pataki Bounce, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1994, § 13, at 1,
6 (stating that four out of five Pataki voters favored the death penalty for people
convicted of first degree murder, and fewer than two in ten preferred life in prison
without parole). Moreover, support among the public for the death penalty is near a
record high. See also Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardeningof the Atti-

tudes: Americans' Views on the Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA:
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 90. When the support for the death penalty and the unsympathetic nature of a death penalty eligible defendant are considered, one has to
question whether the normal functioning of the political process would be an effective
check of a governor's use of the power to supersede a district attorney. It likely
would not, especially given that there are so many other issues that affect the voting
of constituents with respect to incumbents. For example, it is not likely that a governor would be voted out of office for improperly removing a district attorney who
would not seek the death penalty, if, for example, at the time of election, the economy
of the state was in a state of prosperity.
The decision to supersede a district attorney is highly political in nature and can
become embroiled in controversy. The confrontation between Governor Pataki and
the Bronx DA was described as an "unprecedented feud." Swarms, supra note 168.
This feud was carried out through faxes, press conferences, and even before a national
audience on the "Today" show. See id. Moreover, during the press conference in
which Governor Pataki announced the supersedure of the Bronx DA, Officer Gillespie's brother, Officer Gillespie's partner, and the President of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association flanked the Governor. See id. This was not an unusual tactic for
Governor Pataki, who signed the death penalty bill into law using the pens that belonged to police officers killed in the line of duty while police union officials and the
relatives of seven murder victims observed. See id. (The signing of the bill "as the
cameras whirred" was described as having "all the choreographed flourish of one of
[the Governor's] stump events."). Given Governor Pataki's method of presenting
these momentous decisions to the people of New York State, one may reasonably
question the degree to which the political ramifications of his acts impact his decisionmaking process.
The decision whether to seek the death penalty necessarily entails the exercise of
discretion. The decision of a governor to supersede a district attorney shifts the discretion employed when deciding whether it is appropriate to seek the death penalty in
a particular case from the district attorney to the governor. When a governor decides
to supersede a district attorney, the Governor is deciding whether the process employed by the district attorney effectuates the will of the Legislature as the Governor
views that will. In addition, the Governor is also removing the power to decide
whether to seek the death penalty from the district attorney and placing it with the
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they each contain a useful element, which when combined with the
others, ultimately forms a more effective control.
1. Internal guidelines
The fact that internal guidelines are promulgated within district
attorneys' offices is their greatest strength and, simultaneously,
their greatest weakness. Because they generate the guidelines,
prosecutors, who have acquired a great deal of expertise in the administration of the criminal justice system, 199 decide how best to
control the utilization of discretion and retain their autonomy.2m°
Having experienced prosecutors and the district attorney promulgate the guidelines, however, can be a disadvantage because they
control office policy. 20 '
In the context of the death penalty, where district attorneys generally make the final decisions, the utilization of internal guidelines
pragmatically place no check upon the discretion of the district attorney. Because of this, internal guidelines, individually, are not
effective in controlling the exercise of discretion involved in the
decision whether to seek the death penalty. However, the guideNew York State Attorney General (the "Attorney General"). While this does not
mean that the Attorney General will be unable to independently assess the appropriateness of the death penalty as punishment in the particular case, it does raise the
concern that the Attorney General will undergo tremendous political pressure from
the governor to decide in a manner that is consistent with the Governor's view. See,
e.g., Horowitz, supra note 150, at 2592-93, 2600. This concern is heightened when the
Attorney General shares the same views as the Governor regarding the utilization of
the death penalty. While the same could point could be asserted regarding the effect
of political pressure on a district attorney's decision to seek the death penalty, the
district attorney is at least directly politically accountable for his decision, and thus
the concern is lessened.
199. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our AdministrativeSystem of CriminalJustice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2136-37, 2141 (1998).
Our criminal justice system will remain "a functioning administrative system
of punishment... [s]o long as our criminal codes contain too many prohibitions, the contents of which are left to be defined by their implementation,
or which cover conduct that is clearly not intended to be punished in every
instance, or which provide for the punishment of those who act without
wrongful intent, prosecutors must exercise judgment about which of the
many cases that are technically covered by the criminal law are really worthy
of criminal punishment. (And, given the number of legitimate cases that
could be brought, so long as crime rates remain high and the resources devoted to criminal justice remain inadequate to deal with them all, prosecutors must also make decisions about which cases constitute the best use of
limited judicial and law enforcement resources.
Id.
200. See id. at 2144 ("[P]rosecutors act in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacity . .

").

201. See supra notes 156-160 and accompanying text.
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lines' preservation of a prosecutor's decisional autonomy is an essential element of any effective control.
Generally, the publication of internal guidelines fails as a control
of the prosecutorial discretion inherent in the decision to seek the
death penalty because of the heated controversy that surrounds the
decision. If internal guidelines were published, it would likely inhibit the formulation of policy regarding the death penalty. However, the utilization of a more limited form of publication, in which
the decision whether to seek the death penalty, but not the rationale behind it, is published would be a useful element of an effective
control. This would allow for the outside examination of the decision, while maintaining the confidentiality of the rationale leading
to the decision. This significantly lessens the offense to countervailing traditional and practical interests. 2
2. Legislative controls
It is argued that prosecutors should be legislatively mandated to
issue both guidelines for making decisions and reports summarizing the analysis used to reach these decisions. 0 3 However, the
publication of internal guidelines has already been rejected as an
effective control of the prosecutorial discretion exercised in the decision to seek the death penalty, 2° and a legislative mandate to
publish these same guidelines fails for the same reason. This is especially true given that legislators generally lack the expertise or
time necessary to enact specific guidelines. 2 5 Also, when legislators do attempt to adopt controls over an area as amorphous as
decision-making discretion, significant difficulties result.20 6 Moreover, while vigorous oversight of prosecutorial decision-making appears beneficial as an abstraction, the risk of even greater
politicization of the decision-making process, and the great deference traditionally granted prosecutorial decision-making, make the
implemenation of vigorous oversight extremely unlikely, even if
law enforcement concerns can be accomodated.
202. See discussion supra pp. 789-794.
203. See Vorenberg, supra note 18, at 1566.
204. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
205. See DAVIs, supra note 20.
206. As evidence, one need look no further than the "brutal unfairness" that can
result from imposed guidelines such as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Pizzi,
supra note 16, at 368. Moreover, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is much
more complex than the discretion employed by the judiciary that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were aimed at controlling. See id.
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Legislative controls, however, are useful in two ways. First, legislators can enact a broad mandate that requires a specific decisionmaking process, but that allows the prosecutors to make the actual
decision free from legislative intrusion. Second, legislators can
promulgate non-enforceable statements that provide guidance to
prosecutors regarding the manner in which to effectuate their

broad mandate.
3.

Judicial controls

Judicial review of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is inappropriate because of the separation of powers doctrine. If the doctrine were to be set aside, however, the implementation of judicial
review still would encounter a number of significant difficulties.
First, judicial review would entail the substitution of a judge's view
of the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion for that of a pros-

ecutor in an area in which a judge often has little expertise. Second, judicial review of the decision whether to seek the death
penalty would require judges to sacrifice the neutral role that is
central to the adversarial process. 2 °7 Third, judicial review would
compromise the confidentiality of the prosecutor's decision-mak-

ing process, thus leading to a "chilling of law enforcement.

'20 8

Even if the foregoing concerns could be met satisfactorily, 20 9 judicial review would not be worthwhile for three principle reasons.
First, the difficulties inherent in attempting to prove that a prosecu-

tor has based a decision on "impermissible motives or personal ani207. In arguing that Judge John Sirica, in handling the Watergate case, inappropriately usurped the prosecutor's role in order to ensure an effective prosecution, Professor Freedman stated that "the adversary system does not rely upon activist judges to
conduct criminal investigations. Rather, the adversary system depends upon judges
who maintain their impartiality, leaving to the advocates for each side the responsibility for digging out and presenting the evidence of guilt or innocence .... Learned
Hand said it best: '[The trial judge] must not take on the role of a partisan; he must
not enter the lists; he must not by his ardor induce the jury to join in a hue and cry
against the accused. Prosecution and judgment are two quite separate functions in
the administration of justice. They must not merge."' Monroe Freedman, Evaluating
Sirica's Watergate Legacy, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 7, 1992, at 7 (quoting United States v.
Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 926 (2d Cir. 1945)).
208. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
209. For example, the Legislature could provide that a special panel of judges
would be provided to review the decision whether to seek the death penalty, thus
alleviating concerns about maintaining the neutral role of judges. In addition, the
Legislature could provide that judicial review of the decision would be an ex parte
proceeding or even limit it to in camera review, thus ensuring that the confidentiality
of the prosecutor's decision-making would be protected.
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mus" are tremendous.21 ° Second, given the great deference
granted to prosecutorial decision-making, judicial review would
only overturn the most extreme decisions. Accordingly judicial review would provide only a minimal benefit, while placing a tremendous burden upon the criminal justice system subjecting all
prosecutorial decision-making to scrutiny. Finally, even if one allowed for judicial review of a prosecutor's decision to seek the
death penalty, virtually no standards exist under which to review
the decision.2"1
Judicial controls could prove quite useful, however, if, rather
than reviewing the substantive aspects of the decision-making process employed by prosecutors when deciding whether to seek the
death penalty, they instead were limited to reviewing whether the
procedural requirements of a control over the decision were followed. As such, the judicial controls would focus on an area wellsuited for judicial review.
4. Administrative controls
212
The argument that an administrative death penalty committee
would provide the panacea to the dangers inherent in a prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty fails on four primary
grounds. First, the manner in which the committee is composed is
problematic. Second, even though the decision to seek the death
penalty is made by a committee and not the district attorney, it
remains equally political. Third, the legitimacy of the decisionmaking process likely will not be increased by the committee's appointment of a seventh member. Fourth, the decisions made by the
committee will not necessarily be more consistent than those made
by prosecutors.
The composition of the death penalty committee is likely to reflect the views espoused by the individuals who select members. If,
for instance, the district attorney and governor both believe in the
210. Vorenberg, supra note 18, at 1542. It would be an extremely rare case where a
prosecutor explicitly conveyed an inappropriate purpose. See id.
211. See Gershman, The New Prosecutors, supra note 138, at 435-36 ("One of the
most disturbing developments in criminal justice over the last two decades has been
the judiciary's failure to provide clear standards that would place some rational limits
on the prosecutor's discretion. The decisions are increasingly ad hoc, and do not lend
themselves to systematic analysis. They appear to allow the exercise of virtually unlimited prosecutorial discretion, and drastically curtail the ability of defendants to

prove the existence of prosecutorial abuses.").
212. It is important to note that this section focuses on the administrative death
penalty committee envisioned by John Horowitz. See discussion supra Part II.D and
accompanying notes.
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aggressive utilization of the death penalty, the committee members
they appoint will probably share their pro-death penalty sentiments. If the governor and district attorney oppose the utilization
of the death penalty, the converse would be true. In addition,
when the governor and district attorney have differing views regarding the appropriateness of the death penalty as a means of

punishment, the committee may become embroiled in what
amounts to a bi-partisan feud between competing pro- and antideath penalty factions.2 13 Thus, the policies regarding whether to

seek the death penalty would vary from county to county, depending upon the relation of the respective district attorney's view to
the view of the governor.
This, in itself, would appear to undermine one of the principle
reasons advocated for removing district attorneys from making the
decision whether to seek the death penalty; namely, the risk of disproportionate application of the death penalty throughout the
state. 1 4 In addition, the dangers inherent in having a committee

that is composed of warring factions are significant. A situation as
politically charged as the decision to seek the death penalty could

degrade into a quagmire of political and ideological infighting that
leads to nothing more than delay and public dissatisfaction with the
process.2 1 5

There also are practical difficulties in the appointment of the
members of the committee. There are sixty-two counties within
213. Of course, this assumes that the governor and district attorney would appoint
members sharing their views regarding the'appropriateness of the death penalty as a
method of punishment.
214. See Horowitz, supra note 150, at 2579-80, 2600 (arguing that the risk of disproportionate application of the death penalty across the state under the current system
is a reason to implement his administrative death penalty committee).
215. In the context of the House ethics committee's review of Newt Gingrich's filing of false information to the House ethics committee, the four person bi-partisan
committee was noted for its bickering and leaking of information. See Adar Clymer,
The Gingrich Case: When Politics Divides Process, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 16, 1996, at B9.
Dennis Thompson, a professor of government at Harvard, stated that the use of bipartisan committees is something akin to the following situation. See id. "[I]f on the
eve of the Super Bowl there is a question of the quarterback of one team having
violated some league rule, and you had a committee of both teams trying to decide
what to do." Id. While the example of a bi-partisan committee's review of the
Speaker of the House is not the same as the use of a death penalty committee with
appointed members, the decision whether to seek the death penalty is a matter of
great controversy that has the inherent possibility to turninto this type of situation.
See also Joseph DioGuardi, Independent Ethics Review Board Needed, GANNET SUBURBAN NEWSPAPER,

Jan. 17, 1997, at 3A (arguing that a nonpartisan, independent

ethics review committee is required to ensure fair and proper investigations of ethical
violations by members of the United States House of Representatives).
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New York State.216 If the governor must appoint three committee
members for each county, this amounts to a colossal undertaking.
Given the considerable ramifications that could result if a suspect
individual217 was appointed through a haphazard process, as it
would be impossible to remove the appointee from the committee
as long as the governor remained in office, 18 a thorough appointment process must be ensured. The question then becomes
whether the appointment of committee members is the best utilization of time for a political officer as important as the governor.
This dilemma could be rectified by the delegation of the power to a
committee chosen by the governor. However, this would further
attenuate both the political check upon the decision by constituents
and the accountability of the governor for the appointments.
Another difficulty with the proposed death penalty committee is
that its members would not be immune to public opinion. It is erroneous to state that members of such a death penalty committee
would be immune to public and political pressure simply because
they are "one layer removed" from the political process. An excellent example of the fallibility of this purported immunity occurred
when a federal judge in the Southern District of New York reversed an earlier, controversial decision in the wake of public and
political pressure.21 9 Prior to the reversal, President Clinton stated
216. See Johnson v. Pataki, 229 A.D.2d 242, 246, 655 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (1997).
217. In the context of this Note, the term "suspect individual" is used to describe
one who is either not qualified for the position, or whose ideological makeup, with
respect to the death penalty, is not completely known.
218. See supra note 196.
219. Judge Harold Baer Jr. initially ruled that a quantity of cocaine seized from the
trunk of a car was suppressed because police officers did not have reasonable suspicion to pull over the driver of the car. See Alison Mitchell, Clinton PressingJudge To
Relent: President Wants a Reversal of Drug Evidence Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
1996, at Al, B3. Judge Baer held that there was not reasonable suspicion even though
the police officers had witnessed four individuals place several bags in the trunk of the
car at approximately 5 A.M. See id. at Al. Judge Baer also ruled that running from
the police was not "suspicious behavior in Washington Heights" because of the reputation that police had in that area for corruption and violence. See id. at B3. President Clinton asked Judge Baer to reverse his decision or the President might ask for
his resignation. See id. at Al. Subsequently, the Judge did reverse his decision. See
Don Van Natta Jr., Under Pressure, Federal Judge Reverses Decision in Drug Case:
His OriginalRuling 'Demeaned' Police, He Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,1996, at B3. The
Judge stated that the reversal of the decision was based largely upon the testimony of
the second police officer at the scene, which led to a change in his view about the
credibility of both sides. See id. Barry Kamins, a past president of the Brooklyn Bar
Association, stated that it was "strange for an officer who appeared to be lacking in
See id. Mr. Kamins stated he
credibility to now have the mantle of believability ....
hoped that "the judge hadn't bowed to political pressure [but rather] decided this case
on the facts." See id.
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that if the judge did not reverse his decision, he might be asked to
resign. 220 Even though President Clinton could only request that
the judge resign-because there were no grounds for impeachment
the judge relented in a ruling described by outside experts as
"extraordinary." 22 1
Significant implications exist where a judge who has life tenure,
and is thus more insulated from public and political pressure than
the members of a death penalty committee, can be pressured into
reversing an unpopular decision.22 Individuals remain committee
members only so long as their appointers remain in office.2 23 Assuming that the committee members are interested in keeping their
positions, they accordingly would have a vested interest in doing
what is politically popular with the constituents of their respective
appointers. Even if this is not the case, the previous example demonstrates how public pressure can influence a public official's ability to decide controversial issues, even in the face of absolute job
security.
The claim that the presence of a "moderate" seventh member
appointed by the committee after the "negotiation" of its members
will further enhance the legitimacy of the committee's decisions
and will ensure a "thoughtful and even-handed decision" is similarly misplaced.224 There is no guarantee that the seventh member,
chosen by the other six members of the committee, will indeed be a
true moderate, ideologically falling between the competing factions
of the committee. For example, if the district attorney and the governor share the same viewpoints, it is very likely that the "moderate" member will embrace the view of the rest of the committee.
Moreover, even if the committee members appoint a true moderate, there is no guarantee that this member will employ moderate
decision-making. To support this conclusion, one need look no further than several recent Supreme Court nominations. Prospective
Supreme Court justices were nominated under the assumption that
they would embrace a specific ideology in their decision-making.
220. Mitchell, supra note 219, at Al, B3. This statement was made after Republicans had made it clear that the matter would be a "major issue in the Presidential
race." Id. at Al.
221. Van Natta Jr., supra note 219, at Al, B2.
222. It may be that Judge Baer's initial decision was incorrect, and that the reversal
of his prior ruling resulted in the correct decision being issued. However, regardless
of the legitimacy of Judge Baer's second ruling, the reversal is still troubling because it

resulted in the appearance of impropriety.
223. See supra note 194.
224. See supra note 194.

806

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI

Once they became members of the Supreme Court, however, these
same members adopted a form of decision-making inconsistent
with what their nominators anticipated. 2 5 In the context of the
administrative death penalty committee, the lack of direct constituent control over that committee member, quite unlike the direct
political control constituents have over a district attorney, compounds the problem.
While it has been argued that the publication of a memorandum
describing the committee's rationale for reaching a decision would
serve as informal precedent to guide future decisions and ensure
consistent treatment of factually similar circumstances,226 this does
not follow if one examines the use of precedent in judicial decisionmaking. If this history shows us anything, it is that, with the ebb
and flow of legal, political and social views, or a change in the ideological composition of a court, precedent is often reinterpreted, or
even ignored, to allow for the imposition of the embraced views of
that time. The possibility of this occurring would be even greater
225. For example, Justice O'Connor, who had previously "criticized the reasoning
and judicial activism" underlying Roe v. Wade, affirmed that decision in Planned
Parenthood v.Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) because she believed it necessary "to preserve the right-to-choice precedent." Christopher E. Smith & Kimberly A. Beuger,
Clouds in the Crystal Ball: PresidentialExpectations and the Unpredictable Behavior
of Supreme Court Appointees, 27 AKRON L. REV.. 115, 126-27 (1993). "The co-authored opinion placed great emphasis on the need to maintain stare decisis in order to
protect the high court's image and legitimacy by avoiding the perception that an alteration of Roe by the Rehnquist Court' was based merely on political changes in the
Court's composition. These were arguments that [Justices] Kennedy and O'Connor
had not raised when they participated in the criticism of Roe in earlier abortion decisions." See id. at 127.
This opinion, co-authored by Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter, who along with
Justice O'Connor were appointed by President Reagan and President Bush, reaffirmed Roe, the decision their appointee's found so objectionable. See id. Thus, the
Justices had defeated the preferred policy of their appointing Presidents. See id. at
128.
Justice Harry, Blackmun provides an even more dramatic example of a Supreme
Court Justice adopting a form of decision-making inconsistent with what was anticipated by his nominator. When President Nixon nominated Blackmun for the
Supreme Court in 1970, he stated that "he was fulfilling his pledge to nominate a
conservative strict constructionist." Id. at, 121. Early in his term on the Supreme
Court, Justice Blackmun consistently allied himself with Chief Justice Burger, a conservative member of the Supreme Court, and thus fulfilled President Nixon's expectations. See id. Within a few years, however, Justice Blackmun had become a consistent
"ally of the Court's liberals." Id. By 1991, "Blackmun's movement away from judicial
conservatism was so substantial that ...[he] joined the Court's most liberal justice,
John Paul Stevens, in over seventy-seven percent of nonunanimous [sic] cases while
agreeing ,with the Court's most conservative justices, Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas, in less than thirty percent of such cases." Id.
226. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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in the context of the administrative death penalty committee,
where the precedential value of decisions by prior death penalty
committees would not be binding.
In the end, the fundamental flaw with this administrative panel is
the belief that the danger inherent in the decision to seek the death
penalty is a prosecutor's exercise of discretion, and not discretion
itself. In attempting to rectify the perceived source of this problem, the author advocates the removal of prosecutors, the very individuals who have expertise in making these types of decisions,
from the decision-making process and places this discretion in the
hands of a seven member committee subject to the same public and
political pressure. The panel is just as likely to allow personal
views to intrude upon their decision-making on an individual level
while attenuating the constituent check on the decision. This proposal, however, does involve one element that can be utilized to
form a more effective control of prosecutorial discretion; that is the
idea of mitigating the impact of arbitrariness, bias, and personal
views upon the decision whether to seek the death penalty by involving more than one person. This element of a death penalty
committee is only able to overcome strong countervailing interests,
however, when the members of that panel are prosecutors experienced in the administration of criminal justice policies. 227 It follows that while the utilization of administrative controls in the
context of the death penalty decision can be effective, the version
previously proffered is seriously flawed.
B.

The Focus of Controls Must be to Improve the Decisionmaking Process

Because the decision to seek the death penalty may be subject to
arbitrariness and bias, it is vitally important that it is sought against
only those who truly deserve it. Despite the grave implications of
the decision to seek the death penalty, there are no effective controls over the decision, which is virtually immune from judicial review, to ensure this. 28 While it is arguable that the jury system
227. As used in this Note, the. term "experienced prosecutors" describes prosecutors who have prosecuted multiple homicides.
228. It could be argued that an effective control over the decision to seek the death
penalty is utilized in the jurisdictions that allow a judge to set aside a jury's decision to
seek the death penalty as improper based upon'the evidence. This control helps to
ensure that a defendant is subject to the death penalty only if that defendant committed a crime that is within the spectrum of conduct proscribed by a death penalty stat-

ute; this Note, however, focuses on improving the consistency and uniformity of the
decision to seek the death penalty against defendants who are properly within the
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provides a degree of control over an inappropriate decision22 9 to
seek the death penalty, 230 a prosecutor's ability to select a "conviction-prone jury" lessens this protection.23 ' Moreover, when a defendant is removed inappropriately from consideration for the
imposition of the death penalty, there is no jury control over the
decision because the death penalty is no longer an available sentence. Thus, it is necessary to look to other potential controls to
ensure that the death penalty is sought against only those who truly
deserve it.
Most attempted controls of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the decision whether to seek the death penalty are not worthy of adoption. These controls, at their very essence, remove this
discretion from the district attorney and place it with persons with
neither the district attorney's experience or expertise regarding the
criminal justice system and its administration, nor direct accountability to the public for their criminal policies.2 32 Moreover, these
individuals are subject to numerous illegitimate influences. Thus,
the removal of this discretion from a district attorney, whose expertise and direct accountability help to overcome these illegitimate
influences, in favor of one with less expertise and subject to less
political control, is highly questionable. Additionally, because
prosecutorial discretion is such an essential part of the criminal justice system, any control that seeks to significantly limit its exercise
will fail. Therefore, any control that has a realistic possibility of
implementation and effectiveness must, at least in the present criminal justice system, seek to improve the process by which discretion
is exercised in decision-making.
In creating an effective control that focuses on improving the decision-making process, it is beneficial to incorporate the elements
spectrum of conduct proscribed by a death penalty statute, and not on ensuring that
the death penalty is sought against only those defendants who are properly subject to
the death penalty because of the crimes they have committed. Thus, this potential

control is of little practical effect upon in the context of this Note.
229. In this context, "inappropriate decision" is meant to refer to a decision to seek
the death penalty that is legally justified, but involves a defendant who would not be
subject to the death penalty if uniform policies were employed in reaching the
decision.
230. For example, a jury could check an inappropriate decision to seek the death
penalty by rejecting the death penalty as a form of punishment for a defendant.
231. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,supra note 138, at 422 ("[T]he prosecutor's
ability to obtain a capital conviction has been enhanced by his ability to select a conviction-prone jury.").
232. Internal guidelines, unlike the other previously proffered controls, do not remove discretion from the district attorney and place it with another. See discussion
supra Parts II.A., III.A.1.
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of administrative, internal, judicial and legislative controls previously noted. The useful element of the administrative death penalty committee is that it sought to limit the influx of arbitrariness,
bias and personal views into the decision whether to seek the death
penalty by increasing the number of people entrusted with making
the decision.233 In addition, the administrative death penalty committee, along with internal guidelines, provide guidance about the
most effective manner to shape the decision-making process,
namely, by allowing prosecutors to utilize their experience and expertise in criminal justice to reach decisions without unnecessary
intrusion by outsiders.234 Judicial controls prove helpful, when utilized in a very limited manner, to allow for the review of the structural components of the process employed in making the
decision.2 35 Finally, legislative controls allow for the enactment of
laws and guidelines that prosecutors are bound to follow. 236 These
elements can be incorporated to form a more effective control utilized by other prosecutorial offices, 237 albeit in a less formal and
233. See discussion supra pp. 807.
234. See discussion supra pp. 799-800.
235. See discussion supra p. 802.
236. See discussion supra p. 801.
237. The New York County District Attorney's Office has a death penalty committee composed of six senior prosecutors who review death penalty eligible cases. See
Samuel Maull, Life Sentence Sought for Royster; ProsecutorsReject Death Penalty Bid,
THE RECORD, Nov. 13, 1996, at A6. The United States Attorney's Office in the
Southern District of New York also employs a death penalty committee. Benjamin
Wiser, PonderingDeath, by Committee: What Is a Capital Crime? Federal Panel Decides Case by Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1997, at B1, B2, B4. The death penalty
committee consists of six senior prosecutors that collectively review individual cases
that are eligible for the death penalty and then provide Mary Jo White, the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, with their recommendation
regarding whether the death penalty should be sought. Id. The stated objective of the
committee is both to determine whether it would be appropriate to seek the death
penalty in particular cases, and to improve the consistency of the decisions whether to
seek the death penalty. See id. at B4 (quoting Mary Jo White) ("Clearly the objective
of this process is to not only decide what cases are appropriate to seek [the death
penalty] in, but that we are consistent. I regard it as the opposite of being
arbitrary.").
To best ensure that this objective is met, the committee is staffed with members
representing a diverse range of views regarding the appropriateness of the utilization
of the death penalty as a form of punishment. See id. Each member, however, must
be willing to apply the death penalty in some set of circumstances. See id.
In reaching a decision, the committee balances aggravating and mitigating factors,
legal issues, and prosecutorial strategy. See id. The committee also takes practical
considerations into account, such as the "credibility and strength of witness testimony,
a defendant's background, and the principle of treating equally culpable defendants"
similarly. See id. In addition, the committee provides the defense with an opportunity
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slightly different form, a death penalty committee comprised of
prosecutors.
1. Legislatively Mandating a Death Penalty Committee
The legislature should enact a statute requiring death penalty
committees comprised of experienced prosecutors to review all relevant factual, legal, and practical considerations involved in the decision whether to seek the death penalty. 238 Most importantly, the
statute should provide that the death penalty committee shall be
comprised of prosecutors with diverse views regarding the appropriateness of the use of the death penalty to ensure an ideologically
balanced committee.239 The statute also should provide that the
committee shall not allow a defendant's race, class, gender, religion
or impermissible political considerations to affect its decision.24 ° In
addition, the committee must be required to both allow defense
counsel an opportunity to present arguments why the defendant is
not an appropriate candidate for the imposition of the death penalty, and give those arguments due consideration before rendering
a decision. Finally, the statute should provide that the committee
shall be allowed to reach an independent decision free from influence by the respective district attorney or any political pressure.
To ensure that the structure of the death penalty committee
mandated by the statute would be followed, such a decision would
be subject to limited judicial scrutiny. For example, if the legislature chose to enact a statute that required five to nine members on
the panel, but an office only had a two member panel, such a decision would be subject to judicial scrutiny. In addition, if the panel
did not allow the defense to present its argument before rendering
a decision, it would be reviewable. However, whether the committo make submissions about why the imposition of the death penalty would be inappropriate in that case before rendering a decision. See id. at B1, B4.
238. See supra pp. 7-8 and note 37.
239. Prosecutors who would not seek the death penalty under any conceivable set
of circumstances would not be allowed to be members of the panel, along with prosecutors who were in favor of seeking the death penalty in every set of circumstances
under which the death penalty is provided as a form of punishment. In both circumstances, the prosecutor is effectively refusing to exercise discretion because the prosecutor does not consider the specific facts of the case in making the decision whether to
seek the death penalty., Instead, the prosecutor simply makes the decision based upon

a categorical policy either to seek or not to seek the death penalty in any set of
circumstances.
240. Thus, the legislature would fill the void left by the judiciary's reluctance to
provide at least some form of standard to limit a prosecutor's discretion. See
Gershman, The New Prosecutors,supra note 138.
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tee was truly ideologically diverse, whether the defense counsel's
presentation was given consideration, or whether impermissible
considerations affected the decision would not be 'subject to judicial review. In addition, any challenges regarding the independence of the committee's decision-making would not be subject to
judicial review. This would ensure that the actual decision-making
process did not become the subject of numerous lawsuits regarding
the legitimacy of the decision and thus lead to repeated intrusion
into the decision-making process. Moreover, it would avoid the accompanying burden the litigation of these. issues would place upon
judicial and prosecutorial resources. The presence of ideological
language within the statute, however, would ensure that the committee is staffed in the proper manner by capitalizing on public
pressure and a district attorney's sense of duty to enforce the statute as intended. 4 '
A recommendation to seek the death penalty would be allowed
only upon a vote by the committee members in favor of the imposition of the death penalty.242 Moreover, the recommendation proffered by the death penalty committee should be published in
accordance with the statute. The rationale for the recommendation, however, need not be published. This would ensure that the
district attorney's decision whether to accept or reject the recommendation would be under public scrutiny, while, at the same time,
protecting the office's legitimate concerns regarding confidentiality
and avoiding unnecessary controversy. In addition, the statute
should require the district attorney to give the recommendation of
the committee great weight.
The death penalty committee envisioned by this Note would provide a defendant with a limited right to be heard before the committee decided whether to seek the death penalty. The committee
also would provide an improved decision-making process subject
241, For example, Kings County District Attorney Charles J. Hynes (the "Kings
County DA") already has sought the death penalty despite his personal opposition to
it, and his feeling that life without parole is the more "'appropriate'" punishment for
murder, because it was his obligation under the law. Adam Nossiter, In New York
City, a Mixed Response to Law from Prosecutors,N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 1995, at B5
(quoting Patrick Clark, a spokesman for the Kings County DA). In addition, Queens

County District Attorney Richard A. Brown has expressed doubt about the usefulness of the death penalty and its cost, but has stated that he will seek the death penalty where appropriate because "'the Legislature has spoken and I have a
responsibility to carry out their [sic] mandate."' Id.
242. The required vote necessary to recommend that the respective office seek the
death penalty-be it majority, super-majority, or unanimous-would be for the legislature to decide.
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to less arbitrariness and bias. Additionally, this committee would
leave the decision whether to seek the death penalty to those with
experience and expertise in the criminal justice process and subject
to relatively direct constituent control, while preventing unnecessary intrusion into the prosecutor's decision-making process that,
on balance, does a great deal of harm with little accompanying
benefit. The death penalty committee also allows for the removal
of an appointee, if, for example, an appointee's decision-making is
ideologically inconsistent with what was anticipated at the time of
appointment, thereby insuring the maintenance of an ideologically
diverse committee.
2.

The Composition of the Death Penalty Committee

Any attempt to staff a death penalty committee in accordance
with the proposed statute will encounter pragmatic difficulties in
rural counties because of the stark contrast between the personnel
resources of rural and urban prosecutors' offices.24 3 There are
prosecutors' offices in rural counties that do not have the number
of prosecutors in the entire office necessary to comprise an effective intra-office death penalty committee.244 Moreover, even those
that do have the necessary number of prosecutors within their office may not have a sufficient number of experienced prosecutors
to form a committee capable of assuming the role envisioned by
this Note.
In determining how to staff death penalty committees in a manner that will address this problem, it is important to reconcile the
competing concerns of uniformity of decision-making and constituent control. The goal is to achieve statewide uniformity of the decision-making process utilized by district attorneys in their
determination whether to seek the death penalty while maintaining
the greatest possible amount of constituent control over the prosecutors who comprise the death penalty committees.
243. The staffing of death penalty committees in New York State is a complex task
because of the great differences in population and resources from region to region.
The staffing of death penalty committees in other states that do not have such stark
contrasts between regions may be much simpler, and thus may not require such complex solutions.
244. See Tracey Tilly, Death Penalty Bias Upstate, TIMES UNION, July 27, 1997, at

Al (quoting Genesee County District Attorney Lawrence Friedman) ("'Unlike some
of the big city offices, we don't have the committee. Their committees are bigger than
our staff."'). In the context of this Note, an "intra-office" death penalty committee is

defined as a committee comprised entirely of prosecutors from that county's district
attorney's office.
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The importance of ensuring constituent control over a county's
criminal justice policies is underscored by the county-wide election
system under which constituents elect their district attorneys.245
However, uniformity of decision-making is a legitimate concern because of the great variance between individual district attorney's
policies regarding the utilization of the death penalty from county
to county.24 6 Uniformity also is a concern because a dichotomy has

emerged between the percentage of death penalty eligible cases
pursued as death penalty prosecutions in New York City and upstate New York 247 since the enactment of the death penalty in
1995.248 Defendants who commit death penalty eligible crimes in
upstate New York are almost two times as likely to have the death
penalty sought against them as defendants who commit comparable crimes in the New York City area.249 The potential solutions
that follow attempt to reconcile these competing concerns. While
these solutions focus on New York State, they also are applicable
to other states.

245. "Prosecutorial discretion in the American legal system must be seen as part of
a political tradition that is built on a preference for local control over political power
and on an aversion to strong centralized government authority and power." Pizzi,
supra note 16, at 1342 (emphasis in original) (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 346-47 (Henry Reeve trans., Cambridge University Press 2d
ed. 1863). "Typically, prosecutors or 'district attorneys' run for office on a county or
district basis and each district attorney is free to set policies for that office that take
into account the available prosecutorial resources, as well as local crime concerns and
priorities. Local unites of government, such as counties, will usually not be as diverse
in terms of political values represented within these units as would be the case if the
political units were larger. Such local units may thus have different objectives and
priorities which may reflect differences in values, differences in the amount of resources that are available, or other local problems." Id. at 1343-44.
246. See generally supra note 16 and accompanying text.
247. In the context of this Note, upstate New York is defined as all counties except
for the New York City area-the five boroughs of New York City, Long Island, and
Westchester County.
248. See Tully, supra note 244, at Al ("Suspects charged with capital crimes north
of New York City are twice as likely to face the death penalty as those charged with
comparable crimes in New York City, Long Island and Westchester County.").
249. See id. (Upstate district attorneys sought the death penalty in twenty-three
percent of first-degree murder cases, while New York City area district attorneys only
sought the death penalty in twelve percent of first-degree murder cases.). This dichotomy is based upon differing ideologies of district attorneys, the political and racial
characteristics of constituents, and the desensitization of city residents to crime. See
id.
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Intra- and Inter-Office Death Penalty Committees Throughout

New York State
The first potential state-wide solution would allow, in offices
with the requisite number of experienced prosecutors, the district
attorney to form death penalty committees comprised entirely of
prosecutors from that particular office. However, those offices
lacking the requisite number of experienced prosecutors would
have death penalty committees comprised of experienced district
attorneys from either upstate counties, a mixture of upstate and
New York City counties, or district attorneys selected from
throughout New York to create the most ideologically diverse
committee.2 5 o
If the district attorneys were selected from offices throughout
upstate New York, the elements of this death penalty committee
would be identical to the legislatively mandated death penalty
committee previously discussed,2 5 ' with two significant differences.
First, a legislative committee would select the death penalty
panel. 2 This concession is required because it is obviously impossible for prosecutors' offices that do not have the requisite number
of experienced prosecutors to create their own committees.2 5 3
While this is not a completely satisfactory result given that the
committee is not comprised of members from each county's prose250. Undoubtedly, these solutions will present a burden upon district attorneys
who are called upon to serve as both district attorneys of their respective county and
as members of an administrative death penalty committee, as they have to fulfill not
only all the considerable obligations of the job they were elected for, but also the
obligations of their committee membership. However, this burden should be tolerable, and it is a small price to pay if the committee significantly improves the decisionmaking process utilized in determining whether to seek the death penalty.
251. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
252. While politics could influence the selection process, two controls help to limit
the impact of inappropriate political influence upon the death penalty committee advocated by this Note. First, the goals of an ideologically diverse panel will provide the
legislative committee with specific criteria in selecting the death penalty committee
and provide the public and media with a basis with which to scrutinize the selection
process. Second, if an appointee fails to promote the diversity of the death penalty
committee, the appointee can be removed.
It should be noted that the legislative committee would select the members of the
death penalty in all circumstances unless the respective district attorney's office had
the requisite number of experienced prosecutors to form an intra-office death penalty
committee.
253. In addition, it may not be possible for the district attorney of a respective
county to appoint the members of the committee in a manner consistent with the
statutory requirements envisioned by this Note. Practical difficulties, including the
considerable constraints a district attorney's normal day-to-day responsibilities impose, as well as the inherent difficulties of attempting to screen potential candidates in
a timely manner, likely would prevent this from being feasible.
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cutor's office, the recommendation of the, committee would be
presented to the local district attorney. This would ensure that the
local district attorney had the final say over the decision to seek the
death penalty. Thus, the individual counties would maintain a degree of control over their own affairs. 4
Second, legislation should ensure the confidentiality of each
committee member's vote. This would help prevent a district attorney from rejecting the recommendation of the committee by stating that the recommendations did not represent the views of that
county. This is important because a decision to reject the recommendation on these grounds might be sympathetically viewed by
the county's constituents. Thus, confidential voting would help
prevent constituent backlash upon such a decision.
This solution would maintain the best constituent control over
the death penalty committees. District attorneys in offices with a
sufficient number of experienced prosecutors would choose the
members of the death penalty committee, and only those offices
that lack a sufficient number of experienced prosecutors would
have the death penalty committee chosen by a legislative committee. This solution also would improve the consistency of the decision for all the rural counties within New York, as the same
committee would make recommendations for all the rural counties
within New York.2 55 However, this solution would neither eliminate the dichotomy between the frequency the death penalty is
sought by upstate New York counties and New York City counties,
nor would it improve the uniformity of the policies regarding the
imposition of the death penalty of the district attorneys' offices in
the New York City area.
A second variation of this solution is a mixed inter-office death
penalty committee for rural counties comprised of experienced dis254. For example, if the respective district attorney believed that the recommendation of the death penalty committee was greatly against the county's community interest-something the district attorney would be in a much better position to understand
than the district attorneys that comprise the committee-the district attorney could
reject committee's recommendation. It is very important, however, that a district
attorney's power to reject this recommendation be utilized in only the most extreme
cases, as the abuse of this power would effectively nullify the benefits of the death
penalty committee.
255. Technological advances such as teleconferencing would allow the district attorneys to "meet" and review the case over the phone, so as to waste the least amount of
time and resources. In consideration of the district attorneys' legitimate interest in
spending as much time as possible representing their respective county, the Legislative could require that Committee only meet to hear the presentation of defense
counsel's argument regarding the inappropriateness of the death penalty in that particular case.
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trict attorneys both from offices throughout upstate New York and
from the five boroughs of New York City.25 6 This would improve

the consistency of the decision whether to seek the death penalty in
rural counties. This solution also would lead to a uniform policy
regarding the imposition of the death penalty. Moreover, by requiring that some of the members of this committee come from the
five boroughs of New York City, the New York State Legislature
could lessen the dichotomy between the percentage of death penalty eligible cases pursued as death penalty prosecutions in New
York City and upstate New York. This would occur because the
New York City district attorneys' general reluctance to seek the
death penalty would counterbalance the rural New York counties
district attorneys' generally aggressive pursuit of the death penalty.
At the same time, this solution would ensure that a majority of the
committee still was comprised of members from rural New York,
with their interests in mind. 7
This solution, however, decreases constituent control over the
death penalty committee for rural counties. The membership of
New York City district attorneys on the committee will significantly
influence the criminal justice policies of upstate counties. This is
problematic because "New York City views" are interjected into
256. In the context of this mixed death penalty committee, it would be even more
important that the individual votes of each member of the committee would be statutorily required to remain confidential. Otherwise, a district attorney could reject the
recommendation of the committee by stating that the recommendations represented
the views of New York City district attorneys and not the views of that county. This
would be particularly problematic because it is likely that upstate c'onstituents would
view this even more sympathetically than the rejection of a recommendation of district attorneys from other counties. This could occur, for example, if it became a matter public knowledge that the district attorneys from upstate New York voted in favor
of seeking the death penalty, only to have the New York City district attorneys vote
against seeking the death penalty, thereby preventing a recommendation that the
death penalty be sought.
This Note assumes that the district attorneys from New York City may come to
similar conclusions to illustrate the necessity of keeping the individual votes of the
rural death penalty committee confidential.
257. While the consequences of the vote and the strong interest that there be no
misgivings about the application of the death penalty remain the same, the number of
votes necessary to recommend that the death penalty be sought must be decreased to
ensure that the interests of rural New York counties are represented. If a unanimous
vote was required, it would be possible for either of the district attorneys from New
York City to effectively veto any attempt to recommend that the death penalty be
sought in every case-assuming that all of the district attorneys from outside of New
York City agreed that the death penalty should be sought. With the utilization of a
super-majority vote, for example, the district attorneys from outside of New York
City would be required to sway only one district attorney from New York City, a
more feasible requirement.
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the criminal justice policies of upstate New York counties in the
name of uniformity without interjecting upstate prosecutors and
their accompanying views into the intra-office death penalty committees of New York City district attorneys' offices.258 Moreover,
by effectively implementing a quota requiring the membership of
New York City district attorneys on this committee, the probability
of achieving the goal of a truly ideologically diverse committee is
decreased because these New York City district attorneys may not
constitute the best choices for membership. 9
A third variation of this solution involves an inter-office death
penalty committee for rural counties comprised of an ideological
mix of district attorneys from all of New York State. This solution
would provide the most ideologically sound decisions with respect
to rural upstate counties. This solution, however, would not eliminate the dichotomy between the percentage of death penalty prosecutions sought in the New York City area and upstate New York.
In addition, this solution would not increase the uniformity of the
policies of the New York City district attorneys' offices regarding
the imposition of the death penalty.
b. A Single Statewide Inter-Office Death Penalty Committee
The second potential solution is fundamentally different from
the variations of the first in that there would be only one death
penalty committee for all of New York State. This pure inter-office
death penalty committee, comprised of an ideological mix of district attorneys from all of New York State, would best solve both
levels of th'f problem of uniformity of decision-making in the decision whether to seek the death penalty. The committee would decide whether the death penalty would be sought in every death
penalty eligible case in New York. Thus, the dichotomy between
the percentage of death penalty eligible cases in which the death
penalty is sought by upstate New York and New York City prosecutors' offices would be eliminated. In addition, the impact of the
various policies of district attorneys' offices regarding the imposi258. The only reason this is not done is because the New York City District Attorneys' Offices have enough experienced prosecutors to comprise the intra-office death
penalty committee, and thus interjecting upstate prosecutors into the decision-making
process would weaken constituent control over the death penalty committee; despite
the stated basis for the disparate treatment, however, it is still troubling.
259. For example, the required membership of New York City district attorneys
may prevent the appointment of other district attorneys that would create a more
ideologically diverse committee encompassing a broad spectrum of views regarding
the utilization of the death penalty as a form of punishment.
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tion of the death penalty largely would be nullified. 260 Moreover,
this solution would allow district attorneys in offices capable of
forming an intra-office death penalty committee to focus on overseeing the administration of their office, as it would eliminate the
need to select and maintain an ideologically diverse committee.
This solution also would have the added benefit of allowing the
public and media to focus their collective attention on this single
death penalty committee. However, this solution would result in
the greatest attenuation of constituent control over the death penalty committees. This would be particularly problematic in the
large urban prosecutors' offices that have the number of experienced prosecutors necessary to comprise their own death penalty
committee.
There is no clear answer to the question of what form of death
penalty committee would serve most effectively to limit the potential impact of arbitrariness and bias upon the decision whether to
seek the death penalty, to increase the uniformity of the imposition
of the death penalty from county to county, and to eliminate the
disparity between the percentage of death penalty eligible cases in
which the death penalty is sought in upstate New York and New
York City, while attempting to maintain relatively direct constituent control. While each of the potential solutions presents a different balance of these factors, the best solution appears to be the
single statewide inter-office death penalty committee. By providing uniform statewide decision-making regarding whether to seek
the death penalty, this solution best resolves the most problematic
aspect of contemporary death penalty decision-making.
Conclusion
While the utilization of a single, statewide, inter-office death
penalty committee comprised of an ideological mix of district attorneys significantly limits the influence of arbitrariness and bias upon
the decision whether to seek the death penalty, and increases the
uniformity of its imposition, the decision is ultimately a matter of
judgment. This lack of absolute objectivity in decision-making is
distressing. However, given the practical reality of a criminal justice system in which broad discretion is granted to prosecutors, and
260. While an individual district attorney's policy regarding the imposition of the
death penalty likely would affect a district attorney's decision whether to accept the
death penalty committee's recommendation, media scrutiny and public pressure,
along with the statutory language requiring district attorneys to give the recommendation great weight, should help control any abuse of this discretion.
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the extreme reluctance of the judiciary and the legislature to intrude upon the actual decision-making process of a prosecutor, it is
an inescapable result of the current system. Unless one alters the
criminal justice system, any attempt to implement controls that significantly limit the decision-making discretion vested in prosecutors will fail. It thus follows that, while the death penalty
committee envisioned by this Note is not the perfect solution, it
may be the best, especially in light of the system in which it is
forced to operate.
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